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ABSTRACT 
Today’s global terrorist threat has the ability to operate in denied and sensitive 
regions of the world, performing missions to undermine government control through acts 
of violence delivered via unconventional methods.  Operations against this type of enemy 
require a quick and decisive military capability.  The flexibility, scalability, and 
unconstrained maneuverability inherent in a seabase, coupled with the decisive, powerful, 
and precise combat potential of Special Operations Forces (SOF), brings together a force 
capable of reacting quickly to changes in an operational theater requiring military 
diplomacy.  A Discrete Event Simulation is used to explore and analyze various 
configurations to a seabase’s structure and force compliment for the purpose of sustaining 
multiple SOF units engaged in a variety of land-based operations.  Analysis of the data 
generated by the model shows the LPD-17 class is capable of sustaining multiple SOF 
units operating ashore.  The allocated area for SOF equipment storage designed on the 
LPD-17 class does not constrain the ability to sustain multiple units.  Embarking the 
maximum number of helicopters a LPD-17 class is designed for minimizes the 
occurrence of and time spent in a delayed state by a unit between mission assignments, 
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The global terrorist threat our nation faces today requires a force capability unlike 
the United States has ever seen.  The ability to proactively seek out the enemy using a 
precise, agile and quick reactionary force can only be achieved through a joint military 
strategy.  The current joint vision of the future introduces a concept known as Seabasing 
to employ, sustain, and reconstitute forces from a maritime environment. 
The employment of forces today typically originates from land-based forward 
operating stations.  These bases require a large footprint ashore and a substantial level of 
force protection measures prior to, during, and post military operations.  In addition, 
political and cultural effects could be felt through the physical occupation of U.S. forces 
within the host countries national borders.  Seabasing leverages the internationally 
recognized maritime space to maneuver and scale its capabilities in support of operations 
ashore.  Seabasing minimizes the U.S. footprint ashore, reducing the risk of political and 
social animosity towards military occupation.  The limited access a maritime 
environment provides, along with the maneuverability of a seabase, increases the force 
protection of forces embarked on the seabase.  A seabase’s size is scaled to the 
capabilities required and the level of forces being embarked.  One ship or multiple ships 
forming a strike group can perform seabasing functions necessary to accomplish 
operational objectives.  This thesis uses the LPD-17 San Antonio class as a single-ship 
seabase in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
Special Operations Forces typically engage the enemy in denied and clandestine 
environments through unconventional means of warfare.  Their precise, powerful, and 
covert delivery of combat power makes them the force of choice in fighting the global 
terrorist threat.  United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the lead 
combatant commander in executing all operational plans associated with the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT).  USSOCOM is responsible for training, equipping, and 




operations.  The Army Special Forces (SF) and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams 
are used in the model to perform land-based missions while being supported from a LPD-
17 single-ship seabase. 
The thesis utilizes Discrete Event Simulation to model the necessary structure of a 
single-ship seabase in support of multiple SOF units operating ashore.  The simulation is 
written in the Java computer language, and utilizes a simulation package known as Simkit 
written by Professor Arnold H. Buss, Naval Postgraduate School.  The seabase and each 
SOF unit are designed with a capacity to hold five distinct supply commodities.  The five 
supply commodities are:  Ammunition, Equipment, Medical, Subsistence, and Water.  
SOF units, comprised of two to twelve personnel, move randomly within the operating 
environment and consume supplies upon completion of an assigned mission.  The units 
will communicate the amount of each supply commodity, via a supply requisition, to the 
seabase.  The seabase will check for available helicopters embarked on the seabase to 
deliver the requested material.  If there are no helicopters available, the units will enter a 
‘balk’ state, and remain idle at their current location until one is available to deliver the 
requested supplies.  Upon availability of a helicopter, supplies will be loaded and 
delivered to a designated waypoint.  SOF units will move to the designated drop 
waypoint, receive the material issued, and move to their next assigned mission.  Upon 
reaching a given reorder level, the seabase will request an underway replenishment via a 
resupply ship operating within the theater. 
The input parameter levels to the simulation are varied using the concepts of 
experimental design.  A unit’s frequency and time spent within a balk state, the embarked 
helicopters’ utilization, and the seabase’s supply inventory net effectiveness are the 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) used in this thesis.  Data generated by the simulation 
are analyzed using regression, statistical and marginal benefit techniques to show how the 
MOEs are affected by varying levels of the input parameters. 
The seabase’s supply inventory net effectiveness is 100 percent for all design 
points input to the simulation.  This indicates the capacity of a LPD-17 single-ship 
seabase is adequate, given the availability of a resupply ship and regardless of the 
seabase’s reorder level, to support up to ten SOF units operating ashore.  The average 
 xxi
number of idle helicopters appears to remain constant and is not affected by the addition 
of helicopters to the seabase.  Helicopter utilization increases linearly, for each level of 
helicopters embarked, as the number of SOF units being supported by the seabase 
increases.  A large marginal benefit is realized in reducing a unit’s frequency and time 
spent in a balk state by increasing the number of helicopters embarked on the seabase as 
logistic support assets.  Increasing the model’s number of helicopters embarked on the 
seabase to minimize a unit’s frequency and time spent in a balk state appears to have not 
reached the point of diminishing returns.  The LPD-17 class ship is therefore adequate in 


























A. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
The United States faces a much different world in the 21st century than any other 
previous century.  The U.S., along with its allies and partners, utilize political and 
military strategies to protect the sovereignty of nation states throughout the world.  The 
purpose is to establish countries that govern themselves in a free political and economic 
environment that conforms to international laws and policies.  The prosperity, freedoms, 
and peace that result from these strategies are threatened by a faceless, borderless enemy.  
This enemy, known as terrorists, comes from either ungoverned countries, or countries 
that are politically and economically weak.  The legacy structure of a ‘Cold War military’ 
will not sufficiently contain and defeat the activities of terrorists across all dimensions of 
warfare.  What is required is an agile and decisive force capable of responding 
proactively to both certain and uncertain threats posed by terrorist groups (National 
Defense Strategy, p. 5, 6). 
Constructing a force with the necessary agility and decisiveness requires the 
leveraging and integration of cutting-edge technologies to military strategies, along with 
overcoming entrenched paradigms that hinder the forward progression of the force 
shaping.  The National Military Strategy defines agility as “the ability to rapidly deploy, 
employ, sustain, and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and 
environmentally diverse regions” and decisiveness as “overwhelming adversaries, control 
situations and achieve definitive outcomes…through tailored packages of joint 
capabilities.”  The catalyst in achieving this force structure is the military’s ability to act 
as a joint force.  A joint force capitalizes on the efficiencies and expertise each service 
brings to the table with regard to specific areas of responsibility.  This capitalization 
greatly enhances the agility, decisiveness, and preparedness of our forces to deter any 
level of aggression and counter coercive terrorist acts (National Military Strategy, p. 15, 
16). 
Transformation within the Department of Defense is outlined in the National 
Defense Strategy through eight operational capabilities:  Strengthening Intelligence; 
2 
Protecting Critical Bases of Operation; Operating from the Global Commons; Projecting 
and Sustaining Forces in Distant Anti-Access Environments; Denying Enemies 
Sanctuary; Conducting Network-Centric Operations; Improving Proficiency against 
Irregular Challenges; Increasing Capabilities of Partners – Domestic and International.  
The foundation of these eight operational capabilities focuses on the integration of an 
agile joint force able to project a decisive degree of military power from any platform in 
any environment.  Many challenges present today attempt to prevent the forward 
progression of this force transformation.  One of these challenges is the potential denial 
of U.S. military access to countries we believe terrorist groups are operating.  This denial 
can be accomplished through political or military means (e.g., ground movement 
restrictions through a country’s territory, mining of harbors, stationing of anti-air/surface 
missiles, etc.).  The use of international operating environments, such as international 
airspace or waters, to project power and sustain our forces will overcome this challenge 
and allow military operations to be successful (National Defense Strategy, pp. 12-17).  A 
concept within the Navy known as Seabasing captures the elements within the eight 
operational capabilities and gives the flexibility to Combatant Commanders (COCOM) to 
employ forces at a moments notice from any international operating environment. 
 
B. SEABASING CONCEPTS AND IMPORTANCE 
1. Concept 
Seabasing is a concept described in many of the Navy and Marine Corps 21st 
century visions and strategies.  The seabase takes advantage of the open sea to maneuver, 
operate and engage in command and control (C2), tactical strike, power projection via air 
and surface, and logistics missions dictated by the Joint Forces Commander (JFC).  It is 
defined as “the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-
employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, 
sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on 
land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)…” (Seabasing JIC, p. 5).  The seabase 
is able to achieve this through its scalability in size and components.  Based on the 
mission given, a seabase can be as small as a single ship to as large as an Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG), and composed of service-specific, joint, or multinational forces.  
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This gives the JFC extreme amounts of flexibility in designing plans to support the wide 
Range of Military Operations (ROMO) a seabase can perform (NWP 3-62M, pp. 1-3).  
Table 1 below shows the diverse operations across a seabase’s ROMO. 
 
Table 1.   Seabase Range of Military Operations (From:  NWP 3-62M, p. 5-2) 
 
The seven foundation principles of Seabasing focus on the exploitation of the 
maritime operating area that either minimizes or negates the footprint required ashore for 
joint forces.  Seabasing utilizes its mobility and scalability to target weaknesses within 
the enemy’s defense, while monopolizing on the large logistic lift capacity of maritime 
support forces for sustainment.  Adherence to these principles allows the JFC to rapidly 
deploy forces while providing a high degree of force protection across all operating 
dimensions (NWP 3-62M, pp. 1-2).  The seven principles listed below are taken directly 
from the NWP 3-62M pages 1-4 thru 1-5. 
• Use the sea as maneuver space.  Seabasing exploits the freedom of the high seas 
to conduct operational maneuver in the maritime environment (to include the 
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littorals) relatively unconstrained by political restrictions. Sea-based operations 
provide the JFC with the operational flexibility to support the immediate 
deployment/employment/sustainment of expeditionary forces across the extended 
depth and breadth of the battlespace. 
• Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence.  Joint forces operating 
from the sea base in conjunction with other globally based joint forces provide the 
JFC with credible offensive and defensive capabilities during the early stages of a 
crisis. Forward-deployed joint forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis while 
enabling the subsequent introduction of additional forces, equipment, and 
sustainment. 
• Protect joint force operations.  Seabasing provides a layered defense for its forces 
derived from its freedom of operational maneuver in a maritime environment. The 
combined capabilities of maritime platforms across all dimensions of the maritime 
environment (surface, subsurface, air, and land) provide the joint forces a 
defensive shield at sea and ashore. The integration of these capabilities and 
freedom of maneuver degrade the enemy’s ability to successfully target and 
engage friendly forces while at the same time facilitating joint force deployment, 
employment, and sustainment. 
• Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.  A force rapidly closing the 
sea base gives the JFC the ability to rapidly scale and tailor forces/capabilities to 
the mission. A seabase can consist of one ship or dozens of ships, depending on 
mission requirements. Seabasing provides the JFC the option to mass, disperse, or 
project joint combat power throughout the operations area at the desired time to 
influence, deter, contain, or defeat an adversary. 
• Sustain joint force operations from the sea.  Sea-based logistics entails sustaining 
forces through an anticipatory and responsive logistics system to support naval 
forces afloat and selected joint/coalition forces operating ashore. The seabase is 
sustained through the interface with support bases and strategic and operational 
logistics pipelines, enabling naval and selected joint forces to remain on station, 
where needed, for extended periods of time. 
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• Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.  Seabasing supports 
global and sea-based power projection capabilities to provide the JFC with 
multiple access options, to include unimproved ports and airfields. This will 
complement forward basing in the JOA, reducing, but not eliminating, reliance on 
forward basing. 
• Create uncertainty for adversaries.  The dispersed and distributed operations of 
seabasing provide multiple points and means of entry. As a result an adversary 
must either disperse his forces to cover all possibilities or concentrate forces on 
what he deems to be the most likely or dangerous options, creating opportunities 
to exploit seams and gaps in defenses. 
 
2. Importance of Seabasing 
The ending of the Cold War brought about a renewed life in small, moderately 
developed states to take accountability for themselves.  As the years progress, they 
evolve to politically and economically independent states that have a voice in the 
international community.  Political pressures from neighboring states may cause these 
newly developed independent states to show no affiliation to the U.S., thus remaining 
neutral in themselves.  This can cause countries to withhold support of U.S. troops and 
equipment within their borders in the event of deterring or preventing escalating conflict 
from within or surrounding countries adjacent to the host nation.  Seabasing allows the 
U.S. military to exploit the international sea space as a maneuvering environment to 
project sustained joint combat power without support from host nations.  Joint forces can 
act quickly and decisively to theater missions through the mobility and support a seabase 
brings to their combat organization.  This brings the forces closer to the fight, decreasing 
the logistics support chain required to consistently sustain them. 
The increased acts of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and influence of non-state actors within the international community directly 
threatens national security and military forces stationed abroad.  Maintaining a large 
footprint ashore increases the visibility of forces within the geographic area, subjecting 
them to an increased risk of attack via conventional or unconventional means.  Increased 
amounts of resources are then allocated to ensure a secure level of force protection is 
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maintained at these Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  Seabasing, on the other hand, 
utilizes the inherent Sea Shield capabilities to give an increased force protection to joint 
forces assigned to, or in support of, the seabase.  This decreases force protection 
redundancies between the seabase and FOBs ashore, and also frees resources, that would 
otherwise be providing security at the FOB, to fulfill other missions within the theater.  
Combining the seabase’s mobility and flexibility in exploiting enemy weak points for 
force entry with the level of force protection given to assigned joint forces, seabasing will 
be a viable alternative to establishing FOBs ashore and “a critical capability for joint 
forces…that increases options while decreasing liabilities both politically and militarily”  
(Seabasing JIC, p. 17). 
 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) 
1. Background 
Special Operations Forces are a collection of specially trained highly skilled 
warriors.  They are trained and equipped to operate in denied or sensitive areas, adept at 
accomplishing covert and discrete types of missions conventional forces are otherwise 
incapable of performing.  SOF is a very powerful weapon, able to project a decisive 
strike quickly and efficiently without leaving behind a large footprint. 
The use of Special Forces is prominent throughout military history.  One example 
is Napoleon’s Sapper Units which engaged in demolition, sabotage, reconnaissance, and 
deception warfare against enemy forces and fortifications (577th Engineer Battalion 
website).  Present-day forces are better equipped, trained, and knowledgeable in 
leveraging technology to their advantage in swiftly striking an enemy’s capability.   
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) manages, equips, 
trains, and employs SOF units for each military service.  Currently, USSOCOM has over 
52, 000 active and reserve military and civilian workforce, and is expected to grow 
further as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) environment expands.  USSOCOM was 
established in 1986 as a product of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act established the strategy and mentality of organizing the military into a joint force.  
Among other changes, it removed functional control of combat forces from the service 
chiefs to the Combatant Commander (COCOM).  Each COCOM is given charge over 
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forces within their assigned geographical region provided by each military service.  
Unlike other COCOM, USSOCOM has its own funding source from Title 10 U.S. code, 
resulting from the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Tribute to SO, 
p. 32).  This gives the power to adjust, reorganize, and directly equip forces assigned to 
the command.  The flexibility given in managing its own forces is instrumental in SOF’s 
role as a global war asset (SOF Posture Statement, p. 4). 
After the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, USSOCOM 
initiated operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist networks.  Their effective 
interagency planning and execution of operations against the terrorist organizations led 
the President of the United States in 2004 to enlarge USSOCOM’s role in the GWOT.  
Their role, as stated in the 2004 Unified Command Plan, is “the lead combatant 
commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations 
against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders” (SOF 
Posture Statement, p. 3).  A Joint Special Operations Task Force is set up to coordinate 
all military functions required to accomplish the specified mission within a geographic 
COCOM’s JOA. 
USSOCOM achieves its desired objectives as a joint forces command through the 
special operations subordinate commands within each service.  The Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPECWARCOM), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and Marine 
Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) directly provide the training, 
equipping, and support of their respective service SOF personnel as directed by 
USSOCOM.  These subordinate service commands tailor their force training, structure, 
and support to fulfill their specialized tasks as the operational environment dictates.  
 
2. SOF / Seabasing Integration 
SOF operates in denied access and clandestine environments that require high 
degrees of stealth, decisiveness, and combat capability.  They rely on the element of 
surprise and covertness throughout the insertion, support, and extraction evolutions to 
gain combat advantages over the enemy while maximizing the safety of personnel within 
the units.  The units are trained and structured to deploy in a very small amount of time, 
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sometimes less than 24 hours.  The speed at which they assemble, deploy, and 
accomplish their missions requires pinpoint operational placement of the units to 
maximize battlespace and operational effects.  Placement of these units can be done via 
single or multiple modes of transportation, e.g., foot, land vehicle, airborne drop, to their 
intended target.  SOF units which originate from FOBs can have a degraded level of 
surprise and stealth due to the enemy and local populace’s knowledge of the base’s 
approximate or known location.  Restricting the ‘visibility,’ or footprint, of the FOB 
constrains operating functions, e.g., force protection levels, C2, or logistic support traffic. 
This in turn can adversely affect the security and readiness of forces employed. 
An alternative to land-based SOF is placing them on a seabase.  The seabase’s 
mobility and unrestricted access to internationally-neutral or denied land-based operating 
environments lends itself perfectly to a platform that reacts quickly to a theater’s 
changing combat environment.  This results in the seabase swiftly being on station to 
employ SOF and supporting forces as required.  The location and freedom to maneuver 
inherent within a seabase minimize the constraints placed on operating functions as 
required per mission parameters.  Logistics, C2, and other operational functions SOF 
units need will utilize existing technologies and support networks already managed by the 
seabase.  A JFC can capitalize on the scalability of a seabase to rapidly deploy quick 
reactionary forces in operations before, during, or post-campaign (NWP 3-62M, p. 5-1). 
The unrelenting pace at which SOF units are employed around the world lends 
itself as an excellent candidate for sea-based operations.  The agile maneuvering and 
speed of a maritime platform to deliver force capability is directly in-line with SOF 
capabilities as a rapid, precise, and lethal weapon.  Once inside the JOA, sustainment of a 
joint SOF will be the most challenging and crucial step in maintaining force dominance 








D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify what levels of support and capability are 
required to logistically sustain a varied amount of SOF units from a single-ship Seabase.  
The model, and subsequent analysis, will help in determining the structure and support 
asset capabilities required of a single-ship Seabase in supporting SOF units engaged in a 
variety of missions ashore. 
Traditionally, SOF units operating in a combat theater populated by conventional 
forces, regardless of military-specific service, rely on a mature and established logistics 
network innate to the theater.  Combat Support Units supporting the SOF coordinate with 
the COCOM J-4 to provide requisitioned material and services.  (NWP 3-05, p. 2-15)  On 
the other hand, SOF units employed in denied and clandestine environments face many 
logistic support challenges.  This may be due to the sensitivity or level of covertness 
required of the missions normally generated for these types of environments, for 
example.  Seabasing provides SOF forces with a central platform to perform all the 
supporting operational functions, regardless of the operational environment’s deniability 
to military force access. 
 
E. MODEL SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
SOF units tailor the supplies outfitted to personnel based on the requirements 
defined by a mission’s objective.  For example, body armor is given to those units 
engaging in Direct Action missions, but would not be given in most cases to units 
engaged in Special Reconnaissance missions.  The commodities of supplies carried by 
the units within the model represent categories of common-use items used in most, if not 
all, of the missions SOF is capable of performing.  The categories include:  Ammunition, 
Equipment, Medical, Subsistence, and Water.  SOF Peculiar items are not modeled as an 
item supplied or requiring support. 
SOF units will perform one of four mission types:  Direct Action; Special 
Reconnaissance; Search and Rescue; and Unconventional Warfare.  These missions will 
cause the units to consume on-hand supplies, and initiate a request for additional 
supplies, if necessary, prior to continuing.  Missions are assumed to be 100% successful.   
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Supplies are carried by the helicopters internally.  The added weight restricts a 
helicopter’s speed, but does not render it operationally handicapped if required to enter a 
combat zone in support of ground-based SOF units.  SOF units operate within the range 
of sea-based helicopter assets; therefore the risk of a ‘bingo’ (i.e., near empty) fuel state 
is nearly zero.  The helicopter acts solely as a logistic delivery vehicle, and is assumed to 
enter a non-combat environment when delivering supplies to the SOF units. 
Additional assumptions: 
1. SOF units and the helicopter assets do not vary speeds. 
2. Equipment specifically designed for a mission type, e.g., body armor for 
Direct Action missions, is assumed to be delivered or returned as 
necessary to perform the upcoming assigned mission dictates. 
3. The capacity of the resupply ship, along with its source of material being 
delivered to the seabase, is considered infinite. 
4. Loading and offloading times for the helicopters, and the resupply time for 
SOF units upon receipt of material, are exponentially distributed. 




The model is based on a temperate region of the world which requires the 
deployment of individual or multiple SOF units from a single-ship Seabase to perform 
various missions.  A Discrete Event Simulation written in Java computer language, 
utilizing a package known as Simkit, represents the fore-mentioned scenario.  The 
simulation is run repetitively based on input parameters defined in the model.  Data are 
produced for each simulation repetition and subsequently analyzed for changes to the 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).  Multiple simulation runs, with multiple repetitions 
for each run, will be performed using varied levels or degrees of input parameters.  This 
procedure, known as Design of Experiments (DOE), can show indications of how MOEs 
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are affected by the various levels of input parameters to the simulation.  Further analysis 
was performed on the output from the DOE process. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
1. Chapter II builds a solid foundation on Seabasing and the military 
components modeled within the simulation. 
2. Chapter III describes the model in detail by explaining the purpose of each 
Java class and associated interactions. 
3. Chapter IV introduces the type and methods of analysis used, along with 
data and graphic displays of the results. 
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II. MODEL COMPONENTS 
A. SEABASING 
1. Assumptions Underlying a Seabase 
The operating assumptions underlying Seabasing contain concepts derived from 
the other three Naval Capability Pillars:  Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Force Net.  The 
seabase must possess the capability to protect itself and forces embarked from a 
multitude of air, surface, subsurface, and space weaponry.  This may be difficult for a 
single ship seabase to fulfill, and would require a maritime escort to supplement with 
applicable defensive technologies absent in the seabase.  The flexibility and adaptability 
to differing missions requires the seabase to possess at their disposal the offensive 
striking power necessary to support joint forces ashore.  This can include naval fire 
support, air strike, or precision-guided munitions launched from platforms within or 
around the seabase.  These elements cannot all be achieved without proper coordination 
through a robust joint / multinational Command and Control (C2) network.  The ability to 
share a common operating picture across all elements of the seabase is essential to 
conducting sustained full spectrum combat operations.  A challenge inherent within this 
assumption is the technology possessed by multinational forces as compared to U.S. joint 
forces.  Inferior technologies may have limited or nonexistent integration capabilities to 
fully realize the critical advantages a secure and reliable C2 network can bring to the 
fight.  These assumptions rely on a stable environment around the seabase.  High sea 
states can wreak havoc on simple operations within the seabase.  The receiving of 
personnel and equipment essential to the mission may not occur given weather conditions 
outside operating envelopes for air or sea delivery.  This adversely affects the underlying 
seabasing principle of maintaining a base afloat capable of rapidly receiving and 
deploying forces ashore (NWP 3-62M, p. 1-4, 6-1). 
 
2. Attributes of a Seabase 
Capability of a seabase is based on size, composition, and mission requirement 
constraints.  It is measured in six attributes.  The first attribute, Capacity, is a measure of 
how much capability a seabase can manage. This capacity covers things such as the 
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number of personnel berthing available to embarking units, the storage area available for 
material and equipment, and the number and types of vehicles assigned to the seabase for 
force delivery ashore.   
The second attribute is the rate at which measures of performance are 
accomplished over a period of time under normal conditions.  These measures of 
performance are components of the Seabasing Lines of Operation:   
• Close – the coordination and delivery of forces to an area of conflict; 
• Assemble – the transitioning of seabasing assets and arriving forces to fulfill all 
required capabilities dictated by the mission;  
• Employ – the employment of forces from the seabase to achieve mission 
requirements; 
• Sustain – the sustainment of all forces by and from the seabase across all military 
operations; and 
• Reconstitute – the ability to rapidly recover, re-supply, and re-deploy forces from 
the seabase to support subsequent operations. 
The rate will be an important measure to gauge whether a single ship or a collection of 
ships will effectively support the force components required for the assigned mission.   
The third attribute is associated with the infrastructure inherent to the seabase.  
This infrastructure covers all systems available to the JFC in accomplishing the mission.  
Over The Horizon (OTH) strike capability, logistics and support services, and vehicle 
specific well deck or aviation capability are some examples of infrastructure systems a 
single or multiple-platform brings to the operational theater.  An evaluation of the 
seabase infrastructure must be included in the operational planning process to 
complement the forces being embarked.   
Interoperability between seabase systems and embarked force composition is the 
fourth capability attribute.  Interoperability of the systems is measured over the full range 
of the seabase lines of operation previously mentioned.  The sharing of technologies and 
innovations across services is vital to joint forces’ ability to seamlessly integrate into a 
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seabase.  If, for example, communications technologies used by Army Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) are not compatible with the seabase’s communications suite, the Joint 
Forces Commander (JFC) may resort to using inferior communications or require the 
addition of other maritime assets with the communication capability to the seabase.  This 
can require additional time and funding to establish proper interoperability, thus slowing 
down the planning process and subsequent mission commencement.   
The fifth attribute describes how survivable the seabase is, and how it can protect 
the forces assigned to it.  It extends to forces within the seabase and those forces ashore 
supported by the seabase.  The level of security given to forces ashore is constrained by 
the assets available to the seabase, and is dependent on the operating environment and 
covertness of the mission.  This is currently one of the most challenging attributes to 
maintain at an appropriate level of security given the dynamic and asymmetric threats the 
U.S. faces from its enemies.   
The final capability attribute is accessibility.  Accessibility refers to both the 
seabase’s and the embarked force’s ability to operate within an environment susceptible 
to harsh weather conditions, multi-dimensional threats, geographic challenges ashore, or 
depth of operations dictated by the mission.  Equipment and materials available to the 
seabase may be incompatible to fulfill the mission objectives, thus requiring the 
establishment or use of a logistics network to requisition needed materials, or scaling of 
the seabase to acquire capabilities necessary to fulfill those objectives (Seabasing JIC, pp. 
7 – 9; NWP 3-62M, p. 6-2). 
 
3. Seabasing Logistics 
Seabasing logistics is a dynamic process that spans the entire Range of Military 
Operations (ROMO) and has its foundation in supporting joint forces both afloat and 
ashore.  Across the Joint Operating Area (JOA), logistic capabilities are controlled by the 
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).  These capabilities, along with 
C2, must be integrated and synchronized with the objectives and operational plans being 
pursued by the sea-based forces.  Scalability and flexibility of the capabilities are crucial 
to allow proper adaptation of logistic plans and networks to the sea base’s operating 
environment (NWP 3-62M, p. 2-1). 
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Each individual service component commander maintains control of all logistic 
capabilities for their own services’ forces.  The coordination of all service component 
commanders’ logistics is the responsibility of the JFC.  It is the JFC who has directive 
authority to shift and/or align logistic resources among the service component 
commanders to or through the seabase in aligning operational plans to the corresponding 
support required.  During the initial stages of an operation, forward-deployed and pre-
positioned forces will utilize existing pre-positioned material and logistic networks until 
the seabase arrives and is fully functioning.  Advanced Logistic Support Site (ALSS) and 
a Forward Logistic Site (FLS) are both established to act as transshipment points between 
Continental United States (CONUS)-based support activities and the sea base itself.  
Through these logistic sites, all material and personnel are routed to support sea-based 
operations within the JOA.  The rapid establishment of these sites is critical in the initial 
stages of the operation to provide a stable and responsive logistic network to “receive, 
reconfigure, store, load, transport, and distribute supplies and material throughout the 
seabase and supporting sites” (NWP 3-62M p. 6-1).  Figure 1 below is a basic 
representation of a seabase’s logistic structure for a given JOA.   
 
Figure 1.   Overview of Seabasing (From:  NWP 3-62M, p. 1-2) 
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Peacetime logistic pipelines are expanded early in the operational planning 
process to support the increased volume of resources flowing into and out of the seabase.  
Logisticians face an extreme challenge in balancing the increased flow of material into 
theater with the effective sustainment of joint sea-based forces over the entire ROMO, 
while facing numerous constraints (mentioned previously in the Seabasing – Attributes of 
a Seabase section) on the logistical capability of the seabase.  These constraints are 
considered within the planning process to provide the groundwork for a logistic network 
to be established through the seabase.  They must be managed carefully to avoid 
overstating or understating the required logistic support of sea-based forces.  Once the 
logistics network is erected, a Common Logistics Operating Picture (LOGCOP) is 
generated which provides decision makers enhanced response and flow information of 
material through this network.  In other words, it provides real-time visibility and status 
of material and equipment entering and exiting the JOA.  In addition, LOGCOP provides 
micro-level information on critical requisitioned parts and its effects on force capability 
(NWP 3-62M, pp. 6-2 thru 6-5). 
 Once operational, the seabase performs all logistic functions for the sea-based 
forces employed.  The degree and scalability of the planning considerations will 
determine the degree and scalability of logistic functions the seabase will perform.  This 
is an important factor when considering whether a single or multiple-ship seabase is 
appropriate for the mission.  The logistic functions are listed below as they pertain to the 
seabase structure and design. 
• Supply and Sustainment – The seabase is responsible for the supply and sustained 
delivery of material to forces within the theater.  This material includes ordnance, 
provisions, consumables, repair parts, construction material, petroleum oil and 
lubricants (POL), and major end items.  The number of consumers, commodity 
consumption rate, and composition of the force will determine the level of supply 
and sustainment required. 
• Contracting – Contracting with local host nation entities enhances each of the 
logistic functions of the seabase.  It utilizes local supplies and services to perform 
the functions otherwise performed by entities external to the JOA.  Local 
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contracting speeds up the process of delivering critical material and services to 
forces relative to waiting for the scheduling of internal delivery assets and transit 
time to provide supporting requirements.   
• Transportation and Distribution – Critical to the pace of the operations is the 
process of delivering material to the fighting forces.  The pace is constrained by 
several physical variables.  First is the amount of logistic delivery assets available 
to the seabase.  This includes both inter-theater and intra-theater transportation.  
Once the amount and type of assets available are known, the second variable, 
accessible infrastructure, constrains the type of logistic delivery assets available.  
For example, a region within the JOA may not contain runways long enough to 
handle the C-5 Galaxy take-off and landing length requirements.  This will 
prevent heavy airlift from delivering material, and may require additional land 
assets to be used as a suitable substitute.  The third variable is the distance and 
geographical boundaries between the ALSS, FLS, and the seabase. This variable 
may restrict the types of air, land, and maritime logistic delivery vehicles used to 
support operating forces.  Additional scheduling of refueling assets to extend 
delivery vehicle range or pre-positioning additional material may alleviate 
deficiencies within this variable.  Prioritization of supplies and C2 coordination of 
delivery assets is the final variable, and critical to optimizing the use of assets 
while serving the critical requirements needed by forward operating forces. 
• Maintenance – Maintenance is segregated by the level of repair required on a 
serviceable part or major end item.  The three levels are Organizational, 
Intermediate, and Depot.  The capability of a seabase only extends to the 
organizational and intermediate levels of maintenance.  Organizational repair will 
be done at the unit level repair organizations located at the seabase or within the 
forward operating forces.  Intermediate repair can be done within the seabase 
infrastructure, such as the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) 
on aircraft carriers, or ashore within maintenance activities located at forward 
operating bases.  Maintenance is dependent on the Transportation and 
Distribution function to move parts and equipment to and from the maintenance 
19 
activities.  This can constrain the scheduling and turn-around of equipment to 
operating condition based on the logistic delivery assets available to the seabase. 
• Engineering – Employment of engineering battalions early in the phases of an 
operation can aid in the smooth transition of logistic function responsibility from 
the pre-positioned force support structure to the seabase.  Engineers can construct, 
modify, or repair Air Point of Debarkation (APOD), Sea Port of Debarkation 
(SPOD), and ALSS, FLS, and intra-theater transportation infrastructure necessary 
to establish the required logistics network dictated by the operational planning 
objective. 
• Health Service Support – This function provides the full spectrum of medical care 
and preventive measures to maintain proper health and sanitation within the JOA.  
The seabase is responsible for the full spectrum of medical support to the 
operating forces, to include evacuation of casualties to the seabase, providing 
adequate medical infrastructure on the seabase, and the evacuation of casualties 
from the seabase to advanced medical care facilities outside the JOA. 
• Other Services / Facilities Support – Seabasing operations may require additional 
services not previously mentioned, to include “salvage and harbor clearance, 
mortuary affairs, postal, disbursing, billeting, exchange services, food services, 
etc” (NWP 3-62M, p. 6-9).  These services can either be inherent within the 
seabase’s infrastructure, or gained from external sources such as the ALSS, FLS, 
or host-nation contracting.  The seabase has a limit on the size of force and 
duration of the operation it can support with other services / facilities.  Arranging 
additional logistic sorties or establishing contracts within the JOA early in the 
planning process will enable the seabase to support forces in the chance that 
operations exceed the required timeline of completion. 
As the operational picture changes during a campaign, so should the logistics 
network which supports the operational forces.  Planners will constantly evaluate the 
planning considerations and functions of the seabase to gauge whether or not effective 
logistic practices are in place.  A delicate balance of what resources are available and the 
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application of those resources can be the decisive point in achieving the operational 
dominance across the ROMO (NWP 3-62M, pp. 6-5 thru 6-10). 
 
B. LPD – 17 SAN ANTONIO CLASS AMPHIBIOUS DOCKING SHIP 
1. Background 
The LPD – 17 class amphibious assault ships is the first of many weapons 
systems coming online to support the current and future U.S. defense strategies.  Planning 
for the ship class started in fiscal year 1991, and was subsequently contracted to Northrop 
Grumman for building in late 1996.  The ship was christened in July 2003, and 
commissioned in 2005 when it set sail for its homeport of Norfolk, Virginia.  The San 
Antonio class is scheduled to have twelve ships in total by 2008, to include those in 
planning, construction, and full operational capability.  It will replace four classes of 
amphibious ships:  LPD – 4 Austin class transport docking ships; LST-1179 Newport 
class tank landing ships; LSD-36 Anchorage class dock landing ships; and LKA-113 
Charleston class amphibious cargo ships (LPD-17 ORD, p. 1). 
 
2.   Operational Capability 
The ship was built to handle the risks associated with operating in the littorals.  
Ship stealth technologies are implemented within the class.  The hull and superstructure 
are shaped and designed to decrease the radar cross-section of the vessel.  This in turn 
makes the ship appear as a smaller object on an enemy’s radar.  Numerous pieces of 
equipment normally placed on the exterior of the ship are brought either inside or placed 
within pockets to further decrease its radar visibility.  Hot spots on the hull were cooled 
to aid in the ship’s defense from heat sensing weapons and visual sensing technologies.  
As seen in Appendix A, its anti-air and surface defense capabilities, along with its radar 
and electronic warfare suites, allow senior decision makers to employ the vessel either 
with an ESG or as a stand-alone detachment.  This flexibility allows multiple missions 
across multiple dimensions to be accomplished simultaneously (Defense Industry Daily). 
The ship’s primary missions are centered on amphibious operations and command 
and control of those operations.  A secondary mission that the LPD-17 can support across 
all dimensions is Special Operations.  A minimum of four hundred square feet of 
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equipment and cargo space is set aside for SOF detachments.  In addition to this storage 
capacity, the ship can embark a containerized Flyaway Dive Locker (FADL) and a 
Flyway Recompression Chamber (FARC).  Additional capacity can be realized given 
special operations missions are pre-assigned to the ship prior to deployment load out, or 
embarked Marine assets are offloaded to create capacity space for SOF equipment.  The 
ship’s design and primary mission make it an ideal platform to conduct SOF operations.  
The ability to land, fuel, outfit, and take off two heavy-lift or four medium-lift Vertical 
Take Off and Landing (VTOL) craft, simultaneously, lends itself to serving a variety of 
SOF supporting roles to include air cover for insertion, logistic support, medical 
evacuation, and rapid extrication of units and equipment.  The well deck can be ballasted 
to eight feet of water over the sill for embarkation of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 
displacement vehicles, such as the Mark V Special Operations Craft (SOC).  The 
additional cargo, ammunition, and vehicle storage capacity allows for small to medium 
sized SOF operations to be conducted from the LPD-17 class ships (LPD-17 ORD, pp. 3-
6). 
 
3.   Logistic Capabilities 
The San Antonio class, just as any Navy ship, is capable of performing underway 
replenishments at sea via either Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) or Connected 
Replenishment (CONREP).  This fact alone gives Navy ships the ability to stay at sea for 
great lengths of time without compromising their location and/or mission by leaving the 
operational area and pulling into a local port.  Unlike their combatant cousins, 
amphibious ships have an aerial and surface logistic delivery capability at their disposal.  
As previously mentioned, the LPD-17 is capable of handling two heavy lift or four 
medium lift VTOL aircraft at once.  In particular, the CH-53E Sea Stallion with an 
exterior hook capacity of 20,000 pounds, the V-22 Osprey with an internal/external 
capacity of 20,000 pounds, and the CH-46 Sea Knight with an exterior hook capacity of 
4,000 pounds give a significant amount of aerial logistics capability to project from the 
sea to land-based forces.  The sea to shore logistics chain can be further extended by 
utilizing the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).  This cargo carrying giant can haul 60 – 
75 tons of material at speeds exceeding 40 knots over land or sea (Federation of 
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American Scientists website – LCAC).  The combination of these air and surface logistic 
delivery mediums gives the LPD-17 the capability to support any small to medium sized 
SOF operation. 
There are a few considerations when utilizing these assets.  Operations that 
involve large amounts of SOF forces to stay ashore for extended periods of time may 
require a Forward Operating Base (FOB) to handle command and control and various 
logistics functions.  Material requirements can then be stockpiled at the FOB to replenish 
the units as needed.  This relieves some of the pressure on both the surface and aerial 
assets to fulfill logistic missions in direct support of the units, allowing them to support 
other critical missions such as search and rescue or air strike.  Another consideration 
deals with the single-ship seabase supporting multiple segregate units ashore with only 
the logistic assets available aboard, and no FOB.  The following scenario shows how the 
logistics support chain would break down, delaying the initiation of operations within the 
area of responsibility (AOR): 
Unit A is on an extended reconnaissance, and requires a resupply of 
materials to fulfill the mission.  The mission is time sensitive, and without the 
supply delivery, it will miss the opportunity to capture its main objective.  Unit B 
is preparing to initiate a direct assault mission on a small enemy military 
encampment.  Something has occurred, and Unit B requires an emergency 
extraction of personnel and wounded.  With two heavy lift air assets available, 
SOF operators in Unit B will require both assets to participate in the extraction.  
This leaves no air assets available to support Unit A’s immediate material request, 
and thus compromises the reconnaissance mission. 
The scenario above is a notional example to show that there are logistic limitations to 
supporting multiple SOF units from a single-ship seabase that must be considered by 
commanders prior to employment. 
 The tasks and risks our personnel face in the operating environments expose them 
to possible injury of any measurable degree.  Medical facilities established in the FOB 
aid in supporting the care and well-being of ground forces under their cognizance.  
Depending on the geographic location and type of mission assigned to SOF units, a FOB 
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may or may not be located within the logistic reach of the units.  The reliance for medical 
support will then shift to the seabase as the primary care facility.  The use of an 
amphibious assault ship as a seabase allows embarked units to take advantage of the 
larger medical facilities available as compared to other combatant ships in the fleet.  The 
LPD-17 class contains two medical operating rooms, a 24-bed hospital ward, and a 
casualty overflow capacity of 100 (Federation of American Scientists – LPD-17).  This 
allows small to larger sized SOF units to utilize the medical capability as a casualty 
receiving and treatment facility.  (Defense Industry Daily)  The combination of this and 
the aviation element capacity inherent on the LPD-17 makes this an effective platform to 
either handle or transfer personnel casualties to hospitals within theater. 
 
C. HH-60G PAVE HAWK HELICOPTER 
The HH-60G Pave Hawk is a medium lift, twin engine helicopter used primarily 
by the Army and Air Force.  Its primary mission is to support the insertion, support, and 
extraction of Special Forces units engaged in a multitude of missions within hostile 
environments, through degraded weather conditions, day or night.  It is a highly modified 
variant of the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter fielded by the U.S. Army. 
The Pave Hawk’s extensive capability is realized through upgraded navigational, 
communications, operational endurance, combat, and tactical data systems.  It utilizes an 
integrated inertial/global positioning/Doppler navigation system in directing the aircraft 
to its intended target.  In addition, the forward-looking infrared and night vision 
compatibility of the cockpit extends the operational and navigational capabilities by 
allowing it to fly in low visibility conditions at very low altitudes.  Satellite-based 
communications, secure voice, and Have Quick radio technologies allow the Pave Hawk 
to feed tactical and/or operational information to its supported forces.  These 
communications technologies are also inherent within SOF, thus making the platform 
highly compatible to supporting special operations.  The addition of two internal reserve 
fuel tanks and a retractable in-flight refueling probe gives the Pave Hawk the capability 
to remain on station for an extended amount of time.  Two crew-served mounted 7.62mm 
or .50 caliber machine guns, electronic warfare technologies, and an externally mounted 
hoist allow the helicopter to support combat and rescue operations in any environment.  
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Installed tactical data systems allow for the receiving and transmission of real-time 
combat information, giving the Pave Hawk a limited capability in filling a C2 role.  
Search and rescue operations are enhanced by locator systems that interface with global 
positioning systems and personnel radios to triangulate and direct the helicopter to 
survivors or units requiring extraction (Air Force Link). 
The HH-60G is capable of performing logistic support missions along with its 
combat capability.  It is outfitted with an external cargo hook located on the helicopter’s 
undercarriage.  The hook’s maximum load capacity is 8,000 pounds, and internal 
capacity is approximately 1,500 pounds (Air Force Link).  According to subject matter 
experts, the limited aircraft maneuverability and restricted speeds associated with 
handling an external load lends this type of logistic operation to be infeasible in most 
combat scenarios the Pave Hawk will be involved in.  Entering a hostile environment 
requires as much speed and maneuverability that’s available from the helicopter.  Pilots 
will therefore more frequently consider supporting units logistically using internal space 
vice external for cargo transport. 
The Pave Hawk’s versatile employment in missions supporting SOF gives JFCs 
the increased flexibility they require in planning operations within dynamic 
environments.  The HH-60G, although Air Force owned, is capable of folding its rotor 
blades for maritime transport and operations (Air Force Link).  This maritime-based 
adaptation gives the Pave Hawk the necessary means to operate from a seabase.  
 
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE (SOF) UNITS 
1. SOF Warrior 
The requirements to become a member of the Special Operations community are 
rigorous and extremely challenging.  The initial phases of training potential special 
operators tests maturity, ingenuity, mental agility, physical strength, and the drive 
necessary to endure the rigors they will ultimately face in the operational environment.  
Unlike conventional forces that are specialized in one area of expertise, special operators 
are trained in a wide range of skills at an expert level of knowledge and capability.  Skills 
such as demolition, multiple weapon specialization, guerilla tactics, cultural management, 
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and foreign language training are a few examples given to special operators over a course 
of their two year initial training (SOF Posture Statement, p. 16).  The intense training 
given initially and throughout a special operator’s career, via programs such as Advanced 
Special Operations Technique (ASOT) training and the Joint Special Operations 
University located at Hulburt Field in Florida, empowers them to face and accomplish the 
rigors of assigned missions within any environment.  Above all, the person, or operator, 
is the number one priority in the Special Operations community.  This is evident in the 
first ‘SOF Truth’ being “Humans are more important than Hardware” (SOF Posture 
Statement, p. 1). 
 
2. SOF Equipment 
The SOF operator’s equipment is the principal component assisting them in 
completing their assigned task or mission.  There are two types of equipment, Standard 
Equipment and SOF Peculiar Equipment.  Standard Equipment is the basic materials 
common to all military units requisitioned through logistic networks accessible by all.  
SOF Peculiar Equipment is designed to enhance the capabilities of a SOF unit to 
accomplish the sensitive and demanding missions assigned to it.  In some cases, SOF 
Peculiar items are standard pieces of equipment that were modified to suit various 
mission requirements.  An example of this is the M4A1 Special Operations Peculiar 
Modification (SOPMOD) rifle.  The M4A1 SOPMOD is a modified variant of the M4, a 
shortened version of the M16A2 rifle, which utilizes Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
items to enhance its capability.  The SOPMOD kit includes:  an M4A1 carbine, a Rail 
Interface System (RIS) hand guard developed by Knight's Armament Company, a 
shortened quick-detachable M203 grenade launcher and leaf sight, a KAC sound 
suppressor, a KAC back-up rear sight, an Insight Technologies AN/PEQ-2A visible 
laser/infrared designator, along with Trijicon's ACOG and Reflex sights, and a night 
vision sight” (GlobalSecurity.org). 
There are many advantages in using COTS, one being the ease at acquisitioning 
the items through local contracts, while another being the fact these items possess the 
latest in cutting-edge technologies to leverage against an enemy’s various capabilities. 
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The Special Operations community is unique in their responsibility of equipment 
acquisition and life-cycle management.  United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) is the only unified combatant commander that has sole responsibility of 
acquisition and life-cycle management for its peculiar equipment.  The imbedded full-
service acquisition staff provides USSOCOM increased flexibility and responsiveness in 
supporting its operators through streamlined logistic networks.  The staff utilizes a 
process known as Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) to expedite the procurement 
and distribution of new technologies into the hands of the SOF units who operate in 
today’s extremely dynamic combat environment (SOF Posture Statement, p. 20). 
 
3. SOF Missions 
Personnel, force capabilities, level of training, and applied equipment are just a 
few of the necessary ingredients in completing assigned mission objective(s).  It is 
important to understand that, because of the ingredients mentioned, conventional forces 
cannot accomplish missions designed for SOF, nor can SOF accomplish missions 
designed for conventional forces.  These missions are specifically tailored for the 
environment, target, and objective.  There are eight different kinds of SOF-specific 
missions:  Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Foreign Internal Defense, 
Unconventional Warfare, Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Civil Affairs Operations/Psychological Operations, and Information 
Operations.   
• Direct Action (DA) – DA missions are short-duration, politically sensitive, and 
combat intensive operations which require specially trained personnel to 
accomplish.  Its primary purpose is to destroy, exploit, capture, damage, or 
recover the designated target with a high degree of precision and force 
employment. 
• Special Reconnaissance (SR) – SR operations occur in politically sensitive and 
denied environments that collect or verify strategic and operational information 
needed in battle-space assessment.  SOF operators utilize the latest innovations in 
surveillance technology to accomplish a variety of missions such as battle damage 
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assessment; location, detection, and tracking of enemy personnel and weaponry; 
or hydrological surveys prior to amphibious landings. 
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID) – FID missions employ SOF to train, counsel, 
and organize allied foreign military or security forces in core competencies within 
the context of national and strategic objectives of the host nation.  Political and 
cultural sensitivities are crucial between the U.S. and foreign nation in 
synchronizing the means and ways to the end-state of creating a properly trained 
and equipped force.  Stabilization efforts against insurgent or terrorist threats, 
reducing the need for future U.S. intervention, and maintaining U.S. relations and 
influence within the region are a few of the goals FID accomplishes.  Typical FID 
missions are long in duration and have variable combat intensities dependent on 
level of insurgent activity in the region. 
• Unconventional Warfare (UW) – UW missions cover a broad range of military 
and paramilitary warfare.  It is conducted mainly by indigenous guerilla forces 
with all levels of support and training taken care of by an external SOF entity.  In 
other words, SOF operates in varying degrees of directing or assisting the 
indigenous force in accomplishing its objectives.  Types of UW missions include 
guerilla warfare; covert, sabotage, disruption, and intelligence gathering 
operations; and evasion and recovery operations.  UW is highly intensive in terms 
of combat and political risk and usually longer in duration than DA, for example.   
• Counterterrorism (CT) – CT missions require the entire range of Special 
Operations capabilities.  These capabilities are used either in response to actions, 
threats, or hostage situations or as intelligence-gathering operations against 
terrorist cells and capabilities.  The length and combat intensity of the missions 
are dependent on the stated objective(s) given to the SOF units. 
• Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD) – These 
missions involve locating, identifying, seizing, destroying, rendering safe, and 
transporting WMD from identified sources anywhere in the world.  The tasks 
required to complete this mission may involve the entire spectrum of SOF 
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capabilities, and may also require the injection of WMD handling capabilities 
specific to certain qualified personnel into the units. 
• Civil Affairs Operations / Psychological Operations (CAO/PSYOP) – SOF units 
do not perform CAO/PSYOP directly.  Rather, they fill a supporting role to the 
units performing these particular missions.  USSOCOM manages CAO and 
PSYOPS as a separate entity from its Special Operations forces, and uses them to 
integrate and synchronize both capabilities to achieve the desired end-state 
effects. 
• Information Operations (IO) – Information superiority within the battle space is 
achieved through the degradation or destruction of enemy information 
infrastructure while protecting and leveraging U.S. information and information 
capabilities.  SOF provides support to larger IO campaigns through different 
inherent capabilities.  IO may also be integrated as sub-objectives to other 
missions listed previously. 
Once integrated into a Joint Task Force (JTF), SOF can provide the enhanced 
combat capabilities required to counter enemy operations across all spectrums of military 
action.  The flexibility to act as either advisors; trainers to host nation forces; or as a 
weapon of stealth, speed, and precision; SOF continues to become the ‘force of choice’ in 
any operational environment. 
 
4. SOF Unit Composition 
SOF units are hierarchically organized similarly to conventional ground forces.  
Platoons, or teams, are anywhere in size from 10 to 14 operators and typically the 
mission deployment size.  The composition of each unit is specifically tailored to the 
mission it is assigned, and therefore may only require a force smaller than a platoon such 
as a squad or fire-team (two person team).  Equipment given to the unit is also adjusted 
based on the requirements of the mission.  In the case of special operations, no two 
missions are the same, and thus the size, composition, and equipment a unit possesses is 
likewise never exactly the same.  Due to the specific missions used in the model, this 
section will cover only Navy and Army Special Forces unit compositions. 
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a. Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) 
Navy SOF is comprised of four Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWG) 
located either in Little Creek, Virginia or Coronado, California.  NSWG-1 and NSWG-2 
is comprised of four SEAL teams, a Logistics Support Unit (LOGSU), and Naval Special 
Warfare Units assigned to various geographic COCOMs which maintain administrative 
control over deployed forces entering the theater.  NSWG-3 and NSWG-4 are the Special 
Boat Teams (SBT) and SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams used as the primary 
insertion and extraction platform for amphibious-borne special operations.  (NWP 3-05, 
pp. 2-2 thru 2-6)  Navy SOF deploy as a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) to 
each of the COCOMs.  NSWTGs are comprised of task units which handle C2, 
operational planning and execution, and a mobility element.  The mobility element can 
either be ground-based, sea-based, or a combination of both.   The operational component 
of each task unit is the SEAL platoon.  Each platoon is comprised of 12 to 14 enlisted and 
2 to 3 officers, each qualified in dive, demolition, parachute, maritime, and tactical small-
unit operations.  (NWP 3-05, p. 2-8)  Figure 2 shows a notional SEAL platoon 
organization. 
 
Figure 2.   Notional SEAL platoon organization (From:  NWP 3-05, p. 2-8) 
 
These professionals are specialized in maritime-based special operations, but able, and 
are currently, working side-by-side with their Army counterparts in land-based operations 
supporting GWOT. 
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b. Army Special Forces 
The leaders in large-scale land-based special operations, the United States 
Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)), a subordinate command 
under the United States Army Special Operations Command, is responsible for training, 
equipping, and employing the five active-duty and two National Guard Special 
Operations Groups (Airborne) to COCOMs in support of missions across the ROMO.  
Each group is comprised of four battalions and a company.  Three of the four battalions 
are the line battalions which house the Special Forces, while the fourth battalion is the 
combat support element within the group.  The headquarters company within each group 
is the C2 element coordinating all aspects of operations.  The line battalions contain their 
own organic support and C2 structure along with three line companies.  Each line 
company contains six Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams.  Two of the six 
teams within each company are specially trained in combat diving and free-fall 
parachuting as methods of infiltration.  The ODAs are “the heart and soul of SF [Special 
Forces] operations” (U.S. Army Special Forces Command (A) Fact Sheet). 
Each ODA is comprised of 12 Special Forces operators.  An officer, 
normally a Captain, is the team commander with a Warrant Officer as second in 
command.  The remaining members are non-commissioned officers specialized in a 
designated warfare area, to include weapons, demolition, medicine, communications, and 
intelligence.  The ODA is a flexible tool that can be used by operational commanders to 
fulfill practically any mission (SpecialOperations.com).  The scalability of personnel, 
skill set, and equipment allowed in the ODA units gives them the combat capability and 
advantage to quickly and decisively overpower the enemy.  Figure 3 below gives a 
typical ODA unit composition. 
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Figure 3.   Typical ODA Composition (After:  SpecialOperations.com) 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Combining the agility of SOF with the highly mobile and self-supporting 
attributes of a single-ship seabase gives the JFC great flexibility in employing this 
revolutionary type of warfare in any combat environment.  This concept, or model, is in 
its infancy and has yet to be fully tested and implemented within joint doctrine.  
Exploratory approaches in defining, shaping, and testing a model can bring to light either 
feasible or infeasible realities to existing concepts.  The modeling approach being used in 
this thesis is Discrete Event Simulation (DES).  The next chapter will discuss what DES 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter, model components were discussed both as single 
independent entities and as an integrated system.  The components were introduced in a 
detail necessary for the reader to frame the attributes and constraints each brings to the 
operational picture.  In this chapter, the tools and methods used to model the components 
within a Discrete Event Simulation will be discussed. 
 
A. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION (DES) MODELING 
1. DES 
Discrete Event Simulation is one of the many tools used to describe the behavior 
of one or many systems (see, e.g., Law and Kelton 2001 and Buss, April 2001).  It is a 
collection of variables and events that produce state trajectories closely imitating the 
system being studied.  These state trajectories refer to events occurring in the system that 
changes the state variables associated with it. 
There are two types of variables associated with DES: parameters and state 
variables.  Parameters are traits associated with a particular system that do not change 
when events occur.  State variables describe a particular trait within the system that 
changes upon the occurrence of an event.  To illustrate this, suppose a bank manager 
wants to study the arrival process of customers to a drive-thru teller service.  The number 
of total drive-thru tellers available to the system does not change when a customer arrives 
(event); therefore it is a parameter.  The arrival of a customer to the system changes the 
cumulative number of customer arrivals to the bank’s drive-thru system for a given time 
period; therefore the cumulative number of customer arrivals is a state variable.  
Performance measures are derived from the collection of data, i.e., the changing values of 
state variables, as the simulation is executed. 
Events describe what occurs when the value of a state variable changes.  Events 
are scheduled based on an inherent time delay dictated by the system.  Each event is 
placed on the Future Event List (FEL) according to the scheduled simulation time it will 
occur.  The FEL sorts and initiates events based on the lowest scheduled time.  Events 
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occur instantaneously; state variables are changed; and future events are scheduled as 
appropriate to the behavior of the system. Once the FEL is empty, the system is thought 
of as being in an idle state.  State variables are not changing when a system is idle, thus 
the simulation terminates. 
 
2. Event Graphs 
Event graphs are a visual medium to describe the interplay between scheduled 
events, parameters, and state variables.  Nodes represent the events occurring within the 
system, and directed arcs joining the nodes represent the scheduling of a future event.  
Additional notation, such as arguments being passed between events, a conditional 
statement governing the scheduling of a future event, or the time delay between two 
events, is added to give the graph depth and a degree of robustness.  Figure 4 shows an 
example of an event graph for two events A and B. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Fundamental Event Graph (From:  Buss, April 2001, p. 2) 
 
The above event graph can be interpreted as follows:  Event A occurs, setting the state 
variable N to zero; if the conditional statement (j) is true, Event A schedules Event B with 
a time delay equal to the parameter t; Event B occurs which changes the state variable N 
by a value of one unit. 
 
3. Listener Pattern 
The establishment of listening patterns between two or more system components 
is a powerful tool within DES.  The occurrence of an event in a source component is 
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“heard” by all components listening to it.  If the listener component contains the same 
event name and signature heard from the source, the event is executed as if explicitly 
scheduled (Buss and Sanchez, 2005, p. 996).  The utilization of listener patterns allows 
components to be interchangeable to other systems without having to redesign the 
individual components.  To illustrate this, suppose we have a school teacher, Mrs. Smith, 
calling class attendance.  Mrs. Smith has three students, Billy, Bob, and Sue.  Each of the 
three students listens for their name to be called, and responds “present” to indicate their 














Figure 5.   Use of Listener Patterns in DES 
 
In the above example, the event ‘Call Attendance’ is executed, and schedules the three 
events: ‘Sue’, ‘Bob’, and ‘Billy’, with a time delay equal to the parameter t.  Billy’s 
listener component “hears” when the ‘Sue’ and ‘Bob’ events are executed, but does 
nothing until the ‘Billy’ event is executed.  Upon this execution, Billy’s listener 
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component immediately executes the ‘Billy’ event and schedules the event ‘Answer 
“present”’ with a delay equal to the parameter t.  At the completion of the delay, the 
‘Answer “present”’ event is executed.  Billy can now take his listener component to his 
next class and be able to answer the call of attendance. 
 
4. Simkit 
Simkit is an open source package, written in Java computer language, which uses 
the Listener Event Graph Object (LEGO) concept to generate objects that comprise a 
DES component framework.  Additional information about LEGO can be found in Buss 
and Sanchez (2002).  Simkit can be thought of as the medium in which event graphs are 
translated into a collection of components that encompass a computer simulation model.  
Table 2 summarizes the relationship between DES event graphs and Simkit 
implementations. 
 
Event Graph Simkit implementation 
Parameters private instance variables mapped into a read/write property 
of the class 
State Variables protected instance variables mapped into a read only property 
of the class 
Events classified by a method with the event’s name prefixed by ‘do’ 
Run Event reset() method that initializes all state variables 
doRun() method updates the value of all state variables by 
firing a property change. 
Event scheduling use of waitDelay() method with the event name, time delay, 
and corresponding arguments as appropriate 
State Variable change the firing of a PropertyChangeEvent 
 
Table 2.   Relationship between Event Graphs and Simkit implementation ( From:  Buss, 
2002, p. 244) 
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B. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
1. Overview 
The model is intended to determine the level of sustained logistic support required 
to individual or multiple SOF units performing a variety of land-based missions from a 
single-ship seabase.  The model is written in the Java computer language using the Simkit 
package to drive different entities in performing various tasks.  The structure of the 
model utilizes a rudimentary chain of command typically seen in most military units. 
SOF units deploy initially from the seabase to randomly assigned mission 
waypoints within the battlespace.  Each performs an assigned mission, randomly 
generated from a discrete list, upon arrival at the waypoint.  Supplies are consumed at a 
rate based on a calculated consumption rate, mission length, mission intensity, and type 
of mission.  Upon completion of the mission, the units will communicate the required 
amount of material to the seabase.  The seabase commander checks the availability of a 
helicopter, and assigns the first available to deliver goods to the requesting unit.  The 
requested quantity is loaded onto the helicopter and delivered to a waypoint other than 
the unit’s location.  This is necessary to maintain the covert state of the unit, and not 
allow the helicopter’s presence to give away their position to enemy forces.  Supplies are 
dropped by the helicopter, and subsequently picked up by the SOF unit once they arrive 
at the delivery waypoint.  Upon completion of their resupply, the unit moves to their next 
assigned waypoint to perform another mission.  If, upon completion of a mission, there 
are no helicopters available to perform a support mission, and the unit supply quantities 
fall below a stated threshold, the unit will remain at its current location until the first 
helicopter comes available and is assigned a delivery mission in support of this unit. 
The seabase holds a finite amount of material for issue to the SOF units.  Once the 
on-hand quantities fall below a stated threshold, based on a percentage of maximum 
capacity for each commodity, the seabase will request an underway replenishment to be 
performed by a resupply ship.  The resupply ship will gather the requested material, and 
deliver the goods to the seabase within a time period of three days. 
There are five classes that represent the military components modeled in the 
simulation.  These five classes are:  SOFUnitMoverManager, HeloMoverManager, 
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Commander, SeabaseMoverManager, and ResupplyShipMoverManager.  The remaining 
eight classes define the inherent behavioral states, supply commodities carried, and 
available missions to perform for each military component as applicable.  Figure 6 is the 









Figure 6.   Model Listener Pattern 
 
2. SOFUnitMoverManager Class 
The SOFUnitMoverManager class creates and manages each unit’s movement to 
a waypoint, mission assignment, and replenishment of supply commodities carried.  Each 
unit is defined by fourteen different parameters listed below.  Weights of individual items 
used in calculating the total weight, in pounds, of each supply commodity per unit are 
taken from (United States Marine Corps Systems Command). 
• sofUnit – Utilizes the Mover class within Simkit that controls the movement and 
speed of each unit from waypoint to waypoint. 
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• baseLocation – The initial starting point of all units represented as an x-
coordinate, y-coordinate pair. 
• resupplyTime – An exponentially distributed random number that is generated 
each time the unit arrives at a supply drop, representing the length of time 
required to receive supplies and ready themselves for movement to the next 
mission waypoint. 
• ammunitionQuantity – the total amount of ammunition carried by the unit.  This 
parameter is calculated based on the weight of eight full magazines of 5.56 mm 
caliber rounds and a mixture of four explosive and smoke grenades, multiplied by 
the number of personnel in the unit: 
17 numberUnitPersonnel× . 
• equipmentQuantity – the total amount of equipment carried by the unit.  
Equipment is defined generically to include weapons, communication and 
navigational gear, protective equipment, and body armor.  The mix of equipment 
needed for the upcoming assigned mission is assumed to be optimal, e.g., body 
armor weight may be replaced by enhanced communication and intelligence 
gathering gear for a reconnaissance mission.  Clothing, helmet, and other 
protective gear are not included in the weight, since it is unrealistic to account for 
a unit losing all their clothing during a mission.  The weights used for 
communication gear are based on the AN/PRC-117F long-range radio, AN/PRC-
126 short-range radio and spare batteries for each member of the unit, and 
computer navigation gear.  One M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) and a 
M4A1 SOPMOD for each member of the unit other than the one carrying the 
M249 SAW are also included.  Body armor is included as the mission dictates: 
15 (7 ( 1)) 39numberUnitPersonnel+ × − + . 
• medicalQuantity – the total amount of medical gear carried by the unit.  In the 
model, it is assumed there is one member assigned as a medic.  This parameter is 
therefore calculated based on the weight of one medic field pack per unit and a 
personal medical kit for each member of the unit: 
40 
30 (1 )numberUnitPersonnel+ × . 
• subsistenceQuantity – the total amount of Meal Ready-to-Eat (MRE) containers 
carried by the unit.  The parameter is calculated based on eight MREs carried per 
unit member.  The quantity of MREs carried per member is based on two MREs 
per day per person for four days, the maximum time length of the mission set: 
10 numberUnitPersonnel× . 
• waterQuantity – the total amount of water carried by the unit.  The parameter is 
calculated based on each unit member carrying two gallons of water: 
17 numberUnitPersonnel× . 
• sofSupplies – Object of the SOFSupplies class that assists in managing the 
consumption and resupply of material to the units. 
• sofUnitRandomMover – Object of the RandomPointGenerator class that generates 
random x and y-coordinates corresponding to the mission waypoints. 
• missions – Object of the SOFMission class used to assign a mission once the unit 
has arrived at a mission waypoint. 
• sofUnitName – The unit’s name in the format:  SOFUnit1, SOFUnit2, …, 
SOFUnit(numberOfUnits). 
As the units move to mission waypoints, and perform the assigned missions, 
supplies are consumed and reported to the seabase in the form of a material requisition.  
Helicopters, if available, are loaded and sent to a supply drop point where the SOF units 
arrive, after the helicopter has departed, to receive the requisitioned material.  If there are 
no helicopters available and a SOF unit’s on-hand quantity of supplies is below the 
unitSupplyThreshold, then the unit will enter a ‘Balk’ state.  A balk state prevents the 






3. SOFUnitState Class 
The SOFUnitState class defines the six different states applicable to a SOF unit.  
Unit state changes occur at points in time when a scheduled event is executed that affects 
various state variables inherent to each unit. The six state changes are listed below. 
• IDLE – This state occurs at two different instances within the simulation.  The 
first is when a unit is created.  The second occurrence is when a unit has 
completed the assigned mission and awaits further orders from the Commander. 
• MISSIONMOVEMENT – This state indicates a unit was ordered by the 
Commander to move from its current location to the mission waypoint. 
• ENGAGED – Occurs when a unit has completed movement to the mission 
waypoint and is engaged in the assigned mission. 
• RESUPPLYMOVEMENT – This state indicates a unit was ordered by the 
Commander to move from its current location to the supply drop point. 
• RESUPPLY – A unit has reached the supply drop point, and is currently 
resupplying its on-hand quantity of supplies with the supplies dropped by the 
supporting helicopter unit. 
• BALK – Occurs when a unit’s on-hand quantity of supplies is below the 
unitSupplyThreshold, and there are no helicopters available to deliver supplies. 
 
4. HeloMoverManager Class 
Helicopters assigned to the seabase are created and managed by this class.  
Movement and mission assignment are controlled by the class upon receipt of applicable 
orders from the Commander.  Loading and unloading of supply materials to be delivered 
to the requesting unit are also controlled here through an interface with the SOFSupplies 
class.  The parameters listed below define a helicopter at its creation within the 
simulation. 
• helo – Object of the Mover class that controls the movement and speed of the 
helicopter as its assigned supply delivery missions. 
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• baseLocation – the location where each helicopter is based, deploys from, and 
returns to.  This corresponds to the location of the seabase given as an x-
coordinate, y-coordinate pair. 
• heloLoadTime – An exponentially distributed random variable that corresponds to 
the preparation, loading, and deployment of a helicopter from the seabase as 
written in (LPD-17 ORD). 
• heloOffloadTime – An exponentially distributed random variable that corresponds 
to the time required in offloading requisitioned unit material upon the helicopter’s 
arrival at the supply drop point. 
• totalCapacity – The maximum internal capacity of a helicopter as given by 
various  subject matter experts within military aviation squadrons. 
• sofSupplies – Object of the SOFSupplies class used to manage the supply material 
loaded onto and offloaded from the helicopter performing supply delivery 
missions. 
 
5. LiftAssetState Class 
The LiftAssetState class defines the five different states applicable to a helicopter.  
Helicopter state changes occur at points in time when a scheduled event is executed that 
affects various state variables inherent to each lift asset. The five state changes are listed 
below. 
• IDLE – This state occurs two different times within the simulation.  The first is at 
the creation of each helicopter assigned to the seabase.  The second occurs when 
the helicopter returns to the seabase, from the supply drop point, and no units are 
awaiting the availability of a lift asset to deliver supplies. 
• INGRESS – Indicates a helicopter assigned a supply delivery mission has loaded 
requisitioned supplies, departed the seabase, and is inbound to the supply drop 
point. 
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• EGRESS – Indicates a helicopter assigned a supply delivery mission has 
offloaded the requisitioned supplies, departed the supply drop point, and is 
inbound to the seabase’s location. 
• LOADING – Occurs when a helicopter is ordered on a delivery mission and is 
currently at the seabase loading requisitioned supplies. 
• UNLOADING – Upon the helicopter’s arrival to the supply drop point location, it 
enters this state to initiate the offloading of requisitioned material. 
 
6. Commander Class 
The Commander class is the main interface, via listener patterns, between the 
SOF units and the helicopter.  The class mimics the N3 (Operations) or N4 (Logistics) 
staff on the seabase in coordinating the operations ashore with the logistic support and 
delivery needed via helicopter attached to the seabase.  The creation of a Commander 
object is defined by a single parameter identifying the available helicopters to perform 
logistic support missions. 
• embarkedHelos – List of all helicopters available to the Commander for logistic 
delivery mission assignment.  This list is populated with all the helicopters 
assigned to the seabase at the initiation of the simulation. 
 
7. SeabaseMoverManager Class 
The seabase used as the logistic sustainment platform within the simulation is 
created and managed within this class.  The use of maritime platforms as a sustainment 
piece brings two important constraints to the forefront of operational planning.  The first 
is the total operational capacity of air and land-capable craft able to deliver material to 
forces operating ashore.  The second constraint is the total capacity available to store 
material used by the operating forces.  These two constraints are captured within the 
simulation as input parameters to this class.  The minimum and maximum values for the 
number of helicopters to embark on the seabase, as well as the minimum square-foot area 
for SOF equipment storage and workspace, come from (LPD-17 ORD).  Square-foot area 
is converted into pounds, within the model, based on the maximum weight per square 
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foot within storage and cargo spaces as outlined in the (LPD-17 Ship Spec 130, p. 3).  
The allocation of total capacity distribution for each supply commodity carried by the 
seabase is calculated using the same ratio (total weight per commodity per unit divided 
by total weight of all commodities per unit) corresponding to the unit commodity 
capacity distribution.  Once the reorder threshold is reached for any one of the carried 
commodities, a requisition is generated for all the commodities equaling the difference 
between current on-hand amount and maximum capacity for the respective commodity 
type.  The parameters listed below define the properties of a seabase at creation and 
throughout the simulation. 
• seabase – Object of the Mover class that manages the movement and speed of the 
seabase.  Modeling effects of a mobile seabase is not within the scope of this 
thesis, but the addition of this parameter will allow movement in later expansions 
of the model. 
• baseLocation – The location of the seabase represented as an x-coordinate, y-
coordinate pair.  The seabase remains at this location throughout the simulation.  
It performs all helicopter and underway replenishment evolutions here as well. 
• seabaseAmmunitionCapacity – Maximum ammunition capacity carried by the 
seabase based on square-foot area allocated to SOF units: 
0.181seabaseStorageCapacity seabaseDeckCargoWeight× × . 
• seabaseEquipmentCapacity – Maximum equipment capacity carried by the 
seabase based on square-foot area allocated to SOF units: 
0.496seabaseStorageCapacity seabaseDeckCargoWeight× × . 
• seabaseMedicalCapacity – Maximum medical capacity carried by the seabase 
based on square-foot area allocated to SOF units: 
0.037seabaseStorageCapacity seabaseDeckCargoWeight× × . 
• seabaseSubsistenceCapacity – Maximum subsistence capacity carried by the 
seabase based on square-foot area allocated to SOF units: 
0.106seabaseStorageCapacity seabaseDeckCargoWeight× × . 
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• seabaseWaterCapacity – Maximum water capacity carried by the seabase based 
on square-foot area allocated to SOF units: 
0.18seabaseStorageCapacity seabaseDeckCargoWeight× × . 
• sofSupplies – Uses an object of the SOFSupplies class as an interface to manage 
the issuing of material to requesting SOF units, adjusting the on-hand balance 
accordingly, and communicate to the resupply ship its requisition quantities for a 
scheduled underway replenishment. 
• resupplyShipMoverManager – The resupply ship assigned to replenish the 
seabase. 
• seabaseReorderThreshold – The percentage of maximum capacity for each supply 
commodity that triggers a requisition action for material delivered via underway 
replenishment. 
 
8. SeabaseState Class 
The SeabaseState class defines the two different states applicable to a seabase.  
Seabase state changes occur at points in time when a scheduled event is executed that 
affects various state variables inherent to the seabase. The two state changes are listed 
below. 
• IDLE – This state occurs at the creation of the seabase, and remains the seabase’s 
state throughout the simulation.  The exception to this is when the seabase has 
requested an underway replenishment via a resupply ship. 
• REPLENISHING – The seabase has initiated an underway replenishment request, 
and is either awaiting delivery of requisition or in an underway replenishment 
action with a resupply ship. 
 
9. ResupplyShipMoverManager Class 
The ResupplyShipMoverManager class creates and manages the movement and 
behavior of a resupply ship in the model.  Movement and mission assignment is driven by 
the receipt of an underway replenishment request from the seabase, along with the 
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requisitioned quantity per commodity.  Requisitions are received and placed in a queue.  
If the ResupplyShipState is IDLE, the requisition will be processed, i.e., loaded onto the 
replenishment ship and delivered to the seabase.  Requisitions received during any 
ResupplyShipState other than IDLE are placed in the queue to be processed upon the 
resupply ship’s return to port. 
• resupplyShip – Object of the Mover class that controls the movement and speed 
of the resupply ship as it is assigned underway replenishment missions. 
• seabaseUnrepSupplies – Object of the SOFSupplies class that acts as an interface 
between the seabase and the resupply ship.  This parameter is used to access the 
requisition and transferred quantities for each supply commodity from and to the 
seabase respectively. 
• supplyPort – The location where the resupply ship is employed from and returns 
to given as an x-coordinate, y-coordinate pair.  Material is loaded onto the 
resupply ship at this location for future transfer to the requesting seabase.  
Quantities of supply commodities on-hand available to transfer are considered 
infinite at this location. 
 
10. ResupplyShipState Class 
The ResupplyShipState class defines the four different states applicable to a 
resupply ship.  Unit state changes occur at points in time when a scheduled event is 
executed that affects various state variables inherent to the resupply ship. The four state 
changes are listed below. 
• IDLE – The state at which a resupply ship is at creation, and while awaiting a 
request for an underway replenishment. 
• LOADING – Occurs when the resupply ship has received an underway 
replenishment request and is loading the requested material. 
• UNDERWAY – The resupply ship has loaded requested material, and is moving to 
the seabase’s location. 
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• UNREP – Occurs when the resupply ship arrives at the seabase’s location and 
initiates an underway replenishment. 
• UNDERWAYRTP – Occurs once the underway replenishment is complete and the 
resupply ship is returning to its baseLocation. 
 
11. SOFSupplies Class 
This particular class manages all activity for each supply commodity and each 
model component.  In particular, it manages the amount of supplies consumed and 
received by the SOF units; manages the amount per commodity of supplies loaded onto 
and offloaded from the helicopter; and manages the amount per commodity issued and 
received by the seabase.  The class uses twenty-one parameters in managing the supply 
flow of the simulation.  All but one of the parameters correspond to a consumption rate 
calculated using the total weight for each commodity divided by the product of the 
maximum time and intensity for each mission. 
• missions – Object of the SOFMissions class that is used to calculate the mission 
intensity and mission time corresponding to the type of mission passed to this 
class from the SOFUnitMoverManager class. 
• Consumption rates – Five commodity types, by four mission types, equals twenty 
parameters listed within this class.  Each parameter is identified by the name of 
the mission type and corresponding supply commodity type.  For example, the 
parameter corresponding to the consumption of Ammunition during a DA mission 
is identified by the name daAmmoConsumptionRate.  The consumption rate for 
this parameter is calculated using the following formula: 
unitAmmunition
daHighMissionIntensity daHighMissionTime× . 
The other nineteen consumption rate parameters are calculated similarly, using 
the appropriate unit commodity quantity in the numerator, and mission intensity 




12. SOFSupplyType Class 
The SOFSupplyType class lists the five different supply commodities types 
carried by a SOF unit.  The five types are Ammunition, Equipment, Medical, Subsistence, 
and Water. 
 
13. SOFMission Class 
This class defines four missions, and the two associated properties of each 
mission, that SOF units are assigned randomly at each mission waypoint.  The two 
properties of each mission are missionTime and missionIntensity.  Both properties are 
randomly generated values using the Triangle distribution.  The parameters associated 
with the two property’s random distributions are defined in the TestCommander class and 
passed within this class’s constructor. 
 
14. TestCommander Class 
The TestCommander class initiates all objects, assigns values to parameters, 
initiates the simulation, and collects data for each replication to further analyze.   
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the tools and methodology used to model a single-ship 
seabase supporting SOF units ashore through the Discrete Event Simulation process.  
Once the various input parameters are selected and processed, at varying levels within a 
given range, by the simulation, data are produced that require exploratory analysis.  The 
analysis methods used and results derived from the simulation model are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses methods used to generate, extract, and analyze the model’s 
data produced by the Discrete Event Simulation (DES).  A Latin Hypercube is used to 
assign values to the simulation’s input parameters.  Input and output parameters used in 
the model are also discussed.  The terms ‘parameter’ and ‘variable’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
A common question managers ask their inventory control personnel is whether or 
not the range and depth of on-hand stock is suitable to meet all demand.  Range refers to 
the individual types of stock held, whereas depth is defined as the amount held of each 
stock type.  The degree at which these variables are kept is constrained by capacity.  
(Other constraints, such as cost or shelf-life, affect the level of range and depth, but are 
not discussed in this thesis).  A measure of effectiveness the U.S. Navy uses in 
determining the range and depth of inventory carried by operating forces is Net 
Effectiveness.  This measure is a ratio of issues, not including partial quantity issues, 
from supply stock and total issues performed by the operating unit.  Net Effectiveness 
goals, set by both Atlantic and Pacific surface fleet commanders, range anywhere 
between 95 percent and 100 percent. 
The utilization of assets available to a theater commander is an important measure 
of combat potential present at any point in time.  In this particular model, the utilization 
of helicopters embarked on the seabase is used as an MOE.  It would be an error to 
believe one hundred percent utilization is optimal for embarked helicopters.  Helicopters, 
or any system for that matter, require an allocation of non-operational time, referred to as 
idle time in the model, to perform upkeep, maintenance, and training for the crews 
operating it.  One hundred percent utilization does not take into account this non-
operational time needed, is unrealistic to maintain a long-term operational tempo, and 
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should be analyzed further if this is a result of the DES.  In this model, a helicopter’s 
operational utilization and maximal use of its mission capability is deemed effective if:   
   0.2 0.6heloUtilization≤ <  
 
2. Design Parameters 
Design parameters include both the input and output variables of the DES.  The 
combinations of input variables at various levels represent an individual design point.  
These design points are derived using a nearly orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
developed by Cioppa and Lucas (2006).  NOLHs are very efficient for experiments with 
many input variables, and allow the analyst flexibility in fitting regression models to the 
results.  The near orthogonality of NOLHs means that little pairwise correlation exists 
between all two-variable combinations, which make it easier to assess the contributions 
of the variables.  At the Same time, by examining multiple variables in a single 
experiment, the analyst can identify interactions (or “synergies”) among these variables 
(Sanchez 2006).  The NOLH are designed for continuous variables; if some variables 
have a smaller number of potential settings, then the orthogonality properties should be 
checked prior to experimentation. 
 
a. Input Parameters 
Six input variables were used to initialize parameters within the DES at 
varying levels generated by the NOLH.  A brief description of each input parameter is 
given below, and the associated ranges of values used as inputs to the NOLH are given in 
Table 3.  Settings for the first two input parameters are rounded to the nearest 0.1; 
settings for the remaining input parameters are rounded to the nearest integer. 
• seabaseReorderThreshold – the percentage of total max capacity for each supply 
commodity carried which triggers a requisition and underway replenishment 
event. 
• unitSupplyThreshold – the percentage of total max capacity for each supply 
commodity carried which triggers a requisition and logistic delivery event. 
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• numberUnitPersonnel – the number of personnel assigned to each unit. 
• seabaseStorageCapacity – total square feet area on the seabase allocated for 
storage of supply commodities used by Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
• numberOfUnits – the number of SOF units under the control of and being 
sustained by the seabase. 
• numberOfHelos – the number of helicopters assigned to the seabase to perform 
logistic support missions. 
 
Input Parameter Range of Values 
seabaseReorderThreshold 0.2 - 0.7 
unitSupplyThreshold 0.3 - 1.0 
numberUnitPersonnel 4 - 12 
seabaseStorageCapacity 400 - 2000 
numberOfUnits 1 - 10 
numberOfHelos 1 - 4 
 
Table 3.   NOLH Input Parameter Settings 
 
Three other input parameters, not included in the above list, are used to manage each 
simulation run.  They are: 
• numberOfReplications – The number of replications per design point the 
simulation will be run.  The number is fixed at 100 for each design point in the 
case of this experiment. 
• verboseOutput – A ‘true’ or ‘false’ value that manages the type of output string 
the user of the simulation desires. 
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• randomSeedString – A randomly generated number using a Mersenne twister.  
Each random number is set as the seed for which all random numbers generated 
within the simulation are based from.  Each design point is assigned a different 
seed value to create independency between design point runs of the simulation. 
 
b. Output Parameters 
The collection of output information is done through the statistical data 
packages within Simkit.  Each data point has four output variables, described as single 
values.  Analysis performed on the four output variables listed below test the model 
against MOEs previously mentioned in this chapter. 
• numberOfUnitBalks – the total number of balks occurring across all units 
assigned to the seabase. 
• averageBalkTime – the mean time all units controlled by the seabase remain in a 
balk state. 
• helicopterUtilization – Utilization measures the quantity of helicopters idle over 
the simulation’s time length. 
• seabaseNetEffectiveness – measures the effectiveness of inventory management 
as a ratio of completed issues, not including partial issues, and total issues of all 
types.   
 
3. Design of Experiment 
A spreadsheet developed by Professor Susan Sanchez, Naval Postgraduate School 
(available from the SEED Center for Data Farming web pages at http://harvest.nps.edu), 
is designed to build the NOLH matrix with the designs of Cioppa and Lucas (2006) based 
on the number of input parameters to the experiment and their low and high values.  Each 
parameter is assigned a column within the matrix, and its values are rescaled based on the 
applicable value range given for that parameter.  The more parameters there are in the 
experiment, the more design points are needed to create orthogonality amongst the 
columns, but more design points improves the space-filling of data points within the data 
space. 
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If an individual simulation run takes a long time, then the smallest NOLH capable 
of exploring the factors is preferred.  Quick run times of a simulation allows flexibility in 
choosing which type, based on number of factors, of NOLH will be used to design the 
experiment.  In the case of this thesis, a NOLH with 129 different design points is used. 
(This would be suitable for exploring up to 22 factors; six factors could be explored in the 
smallest NOLH with 17 design points).  Each design point is then replicated 100 times, 
giving a total of 12,900 data points within the data space to analyze. 
 
B. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS PRESENTATION 
Analysis is performed using a program developed by SAS Institute Inc. known as 
JMP.  It has a graphical user interface designed to facilitate both statistical and data 
analysis methods on qualitative and quantitative types of data.   
Correlation matrices show the degree of relationship between two variables.  
Numbers closer to 1.000 indicate high values of variable x are paired with high values of 
variable y and tend to form a linear relationship having a positive slope, whereas numbers 
closer to -1.000 indicate high values of variable x  are paired with low values of 
variable y and tend to form a linear relationship having a negative slope.  Correlation 
values close to zero indicate no linear relationship exists between the two variables being 
compared.  Calculation of the correlation is not dependent on the units of measure each of 
the two variables are stated in (Devore p. 540). 
Scatter plots aid in visually inspecting if a pair of variables has a linear 
relationship or not, and can also verify the values listed in the correlation matrix with 
regard to their sign.  Red lines appearing on the scatter plot represent density ellipses.  
These ellipses show the region where most of the data points lie, and can further validate 
the correlation value’s sign for a particular pairwise comparison by looking at the slope 
or trending direction of the elliptic curve. 
Linear regression models can be used to describe data relationships or behavior 
within a data set, to estimate parameter values through determination of the model 
coefficients, to predict and estimate a response variable given a set of predictor variables, 
or as a process to investigate the values of a predictor variable which produces response 
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variable values within a controlled threshold (Montgomery, p. 11).  The regression 
models within this thesis are generated by first using a stepwise variable elimination 
technique and then performing residual analysis using standard least squares.  P-values 
for a predictor term indicate the statistical significance of that term.  If a P-value for a 
predictor value is less than the desired statistical significance level α, we will reject the 
null hypothesis of a regression model which states:  the value of this predictor variable 
has no effect on the value of the decision variable (i.e., the coefficient associated with the 
predictor variable is zero).  Mathematical transformation, e.g., logarithm, square root, or 
squaring, of either the predictor variables or the decision variable may be required if the 
underlying assumptions of normally distributed errors and homoscedasticity are not met.  
Fortunately, the estimated regression coefficients are robust to heteroscedastic error 
variance, and replicating the runs at each design point mitigates the problems that can 
arise when errors are not normally distributed. 
 
1. Net Effectiveness 
Net Effectiveness was equal to 100% for all 129 design points and corresponding 
replications.  This indicates the seabase fulfilled the requested amount of each supply 
commodity by the employed SOF units and did not issue any partial quantities. 
 
2. Number of Unit Balks 
A unit balks when the on-hand quantity of any supply commodity type is below 
the stated unitSupplyThreshold and there are no helicopters available to perform a 
logistic delivery mission to this unit.  The number is calculated by summing over all units 
the number of times each unit has entered a balk state over a period of three years 
simulation time. 
1







The distribution of numberOfUnitBalks across the 129 design points examined is shown 
below in Figure 7.  It is heavily skewed right, and the clear bands of responses indicate 
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there are thresholds where changes in one or more input variables may lead to large 
changes in the response. 
 
Figure 7.   JMP Distribution of numberOfUnitBalks 
 
A regression model is used to explain the relationship between the response 
variable numberOfUnitBalks, and the predictor variables:  seabaseReorderThreshold, 
unitSupplyThreshold, numberUnitPersonnel, seabaseStorageCapacity, numberOfUnits, 
and numberOfHelos.  The response variable is mathematically transformed by taking its 
square root in order to stabilize the variance.  Figure 8 is the linear regression model 
generated in JMP.  The 2R value associated with this model is 0.967, indicating the 
model accounts for 96.7% of the variability within the response variable 
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numberOfUnitBalks.  The predictor variables seabaseReorderThreshold and 
numberUnitPersonnel, and all associated interaction and polynomial terms, were 
insignificant in effecting the value of the response variable, and thus removed from the 
model during the stepwise variable elimination process.  The predictor variable 
seabaseStorageCapacity is statistically significant, as seen by a small P-value, but can be 
argued as not being practically significant.  The small coefficient value listed in the 
Estimate column of the Parameter Estimates section shows that for every increasing 
change in seabaseStorageCapacity, the response variable is decreased by -41.84  10× .  
The 2R  value of the model with seabaseStorageCapacity and all corresponding 
interaction and polynomial terms removed, is 0.966 (Figure 9), indicating the model 
accounts for essentially the same amount of variability within the response variable as the 
model shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.   JMP Linear Regression Model for Square-Root of numberOfUnitBalks 
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Figure 9.   JMP Linear Regression Model for Square-Root of numberOfUnitBalks 
without seabaseStorageCapacity 
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More detailed information about the model effects can be found by looking at 
plots along with the signs and magnitudes of regression coefficients (Montgomery, p. 
530).  Graphs shown in Appendix C, Figures 35, 36, 37, and 38 show increases in the 
unitSupplyThreshold lead to increases in the numberOfUnitBalks; validating the positive 
coefficient in the model.  Figure 11 show increases in both numberOfHelos and 
numberOfUnits lead to a decrease and increase, respectively, in the numberOfUnitBalks; 
so the negative coefficient for numberOfHelos and the positive coefficient for 
numberOfUnits (Figure 9) dominate any interaction effects with opposite signs.  The 
magnitude of numberOfHelos and numberOfUnits can also be validated by looking at 
Figure 11.  The parameter numberOfHelos has a greater effect in decreasing the 
numberOfUnitBalks than does the degree of effect increasing numberOfUnits has on 
numberOfUnitBalks; validating the absolute value of numberOfHelo’s coefficient is 
greater than the absolute value of numberOfUnit’s coefficient.  
The correlation matrix and scatter plot for the pairwise comparison of 
numberOfUnitBalks to the three predictor variables:  unitSupplyThreshold, 
numberOfUnits, and numberOfHelos are shown below as Figure 10.  The scatter plot 
verifies the positive relationship, indicated by the estimate value listed in the Parameter 
Estimates block of Figure 9 and the correlation value shown in Figure 10, between the 
response variable and the two predictor variables unitSupplyThreshold and 
numberOfUnits, as well as verifying the negative relationship between the response 




Figure 10.   JMP Correlation Matrix and Scatter Plot for numberOfUnitBalks 
 
A majority of the unit balks occurs with the larger amount of units under the 
seabase’s control with high unitSupplyThreshold values, regardless of the number of 
helicopters.  The maximum average values of unit balks, across all units, for each number 
of helicopters performing logistic delivery missions, and the corresponding percentage 
change in maximum average value by adding an additional helicopter are summarized in 
Table 4 below.  The benefit of adding additional helicopters in order to decrease the 
amount of unit balks is graphically shown in Figure 11 below for numberOfHelos equal 
to one, two, three, and four respectively.  Diagrams detailing the benefit of adding an 
additional helicopter as a function of both numberOfUnits and unitSupplyThreshold are 
found in Appendix C, Figures 35, 36, 37, and 38 for numberOfHelos equal to one, two, 
three, and four respectively.   
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numberOfHelos Maximum average 
numberOfUnitBalks 
Percentage change with 
addition of one helicopter 
1 2026.52 81.43% 
2 376.32 80.04% 
3 75.13 82.12% 
4 13.43 - 
 





Figure 11.   Overlay Plot for Square-Root of numberOfUnitBalks vs. numberOfUnits 
when numberOfHelos = {1,2,3,4} 
 
3. Average Balk Time 
The purpose of this parameter is to identify the average time any single unit is 
spending in a balk state, in units of hours, given the values of input parameters assigned 
to the simulation design point.  The number is calculated by summing the balk times over 
all unit balk instances and dividing by numberOfUnitBalks 
1








The distribution of averageBalkTime is given in Figure 12 below. 
 
 
Figure 12.   JMP Distribution of averageBalkTime 
 
A regression model is used to explain the relationship between the response 
variable averageBalkTime, and the predictor variables:  seabaseReorderThreshold, 
unitSupplyThreshold, numberUnitPersonnel, seabaseStorageCapacity, numberOfUnits, 
and numberOfHelos.  The response variable is transformed by taking the square root.  
Recall the variance of the response variable is stabilized through a mathematical 
transformation of the variable.  The differences and degrees predictor variables have on 
the response variable will be more dramatic if a mathematical transformation of the 
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predictor variable does not occur.  Figure 13 is the linear regression model generated in 
JMP.  The 2R value associated with this model is 0.876, indicating the model accounts 
for 87.6% of the variability within the response variable averageBalkTime.  All predictor 
variables were statistically significant in rejecting the null hypothesis:  all predictor 
effects, i.e. the corresponding coefficient, equals zero.  The predictor variable 
seabaseStorageCapacity, as identified in the numberOfUnitBalks linear regression model, 
can be argued as not being practically significant.  The small coefficient value listed in 
the Estimate column of the Parameter Estimates section shows that for every increasing 
change in seabaseStorageCapacity, the response variable is decreased by -54.5  10× .  
The 2R  value of the model with seabaseStorageCapacity and all corresponding 
interacation and polynomial terms removed is 0.873 (Figure 14), indicating the model 
accounts for essentially the same amount of variability within the response variable, than 
shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.   JMP Linear Regression Model for Square-Root of averageBalkTime 
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Figure 14.   JMP Linear Regression Model for Square-Root of averageBalkTime without 
seabaseStorageCapacity 
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As performed for the previous regression model, validation was done by 
analyzing the model coefficients’ sign and magnitude.  Graphs shown in Appendix C, 
Figures 39, 40, 41, and 42 show increases in the unitSupplyThreshold lead to increases in 
the averageBalkTime; validating the positive coefficient in the model.  Figure 16 show 
increases in both numberOfHelos and numberOfUnits lead to a decrease and moderate 
increase, respectively, in the averageBalkTime; validating the negative coefficient for 
numberOfHelos and the small positive coefficient for numberOfUnits listed in Figure 15.  
The magnitude of numberOfHelos and numberOfUnits can also be validated by looking 
at Figure 16.  The parameter numberOfHelos has a greater effect in decreasing the 
averageBalkTime than does the degree of effect increasing numberOfUnits has on 
averageBalkTime; validating the absolute value of numberOfHelo’s coefficient is greater 
than the absolute value of numberOfUnit’s coefficient.  Figures 17 and 18 display the 
averageBalkTime across applicable levels of seabaseReorderThreshold and 
numberUnitPersonnel.  The lack of correlation between these two parameters and 
averageBalkTime accounts for the variablility in averageBalkTime values as either 
seabaseReorderThreshold or numberOfUnitPersonnel increase.  The sign related to these 
two coefficients is difficult to validate with only Figures 17 and 18, and will require 
deeper analysis to confirm their values. 
The correlation matrix and scatter plot for the predictor variables listed in Figure 
14 are shown in Figure 15 below.  The predictor variables numberOfUnits and 
numberOfHelos are moderately related to the response variable with correlation values of 
0.5684 and -0.5814, respectively.  The remaining three predictors, 
seabaseReorderThreshold, unitSupplyThreshold, and numberUnitPersonnel, show 




Figure 15.   JMP Correlation Matrix and Scatter Plot for averageBalkTime 
 
The fact that each unit which enters a balk state increases the numberOfUnitBalks 
and the time spent in the balk state used in calculating averageBalkTime means they are 
dependent on one another.  It follows then for this model that, as shown for 
numberOfUnitBalks, a majority of balk time instances for each number of helicopters 
occurs with the larger amount of units under the seabase’s control with high 
unitSupplyThreshold values.  The maximum average value of averageBalkTime, across 
all units, for each number of helicopters performing logistic delivery missions, and the 
corresponding percentage change in maximum average value by adding an additional 
helicopter is summarized in Table 5 below.  The benefit of adding additional helicopters, 
as a function of numberOfUnits, in order to decrease the averageBalkTime is shown in 
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Figure 16 below for numberOfHelos equal to one, two, three, and four respectively.  
Graphs detailing the benefit of adding an additional helicopter as a function of both 
numberOfUnits and unitSupplyThreshold are found in Appendix C, Figures 39, 40, 41, 




Percentage change with 
addition of one helicopter 
1 2.786115 56.15% 
2 1.22175 24.43% 
3 0.92330 24.73% 
4 0.695013 - 
 





Figure 16.   Overlay Plot for Square-Root of averageBalkTime vs. numberOfUnits with 










Figure 18.   Overlay Plot for Square-Root of averageBalkTime vs. 
seabaseReorderThreshold 
 
4. Helicopter Utilization 
Helicopter utilization measures the number of helicopters idle, i.e., not performing 
a logistic delivery mission, over the three year simulated time period.  The utilization 
value is derived by dividing the average helicopters idle over a time period by the total 
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number of helicopters assigned to the seabase, and then subtracting one from this 
quotient. 
      1 ( )mean number of idle helicopters over time
numberOfHelos
−  
The distribution of heloUtilization is given in Figure 19 below.  Once again, in the 
upper tail of the distribution there are clear thresholds where heloUtilization jumps from 
one level to another 
 
Figure 19.   JMP Distribution of heloUtilization 
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A regression model is used to explain the relationship between the response 
variable heloUtilization, and the predictor variables:  seabaseReorderThreshold, 
unitSupplyThreshold, numberUnitPersonnel, seabaseStorageCapacity, numberOfUnits, 
and numberOfHelos.  Figure 20 is the linear regression model generated in JMP.  The 
2R value associated with this model is 0.981, indicating the model accounts for 98.1% of 
the variability within the response variable heloUtilization.  All predictor variables were 
statistically significant, but the predictor variables seabaseStorageCapacity and 
numberUnitPersonnel can be argued as not being practically significant.  The small 
coefficient value listed in the Estimate column of the Parameter Estimates section shows 
that for every increasing change in seabaseStorageCapacity and numberUnitPersonnel, 
the response variable is decreased by -62.0  10×  and increased by -46.75  10× , 
respectively.  The 2R  value of the linear regression model with seabaseStorageCapacity, 
numberUnitPersonnel, and all corresponding interaction and polynomial terms removed 
is 0.980 (Figure 21), indicating the model accounts for essentially the same variability 
within the response variable, as the model shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20.   JMP Linear Regression Model for heloUtilization 
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Figure 21.   JMP Linear Regression Model for heloUtilization without 




As performed for the previous regression models, validation was done by 
analyzing the model coefficients’ sign and magnitude.  Graphs shown in Appendix C, 
Figures 43, 44, 45, and 46 show increases in the unitSupplyThreshold lead to moderate 
increases in the heloUtilization as numberOfUnits increase; validating the coefficient’s 
positive sign and magnitude in the model.  Figure 23 shows increases in both 
numberOfHelos and numberOfUnits lead to a moderate decrease and moderate increase, 
respectively, in the heloUtilization; validating the negative coefficient for 
numberOfHelos, the small positive coefficient for numberOfUnits, and their respective 
small coefficient magnitudes listed in Figure 21.  Figures 24 and 25 are overlay plots 
displaying heloUtilization across applicable levels of seabaseReorderThreshold and 
unitSupplyThreshold.  The lack of correlation between seabaseReorderThreshold, 
unitSupplyThreshold and heloUtilization accounts for the variablility in heloUtilization 
values as both are increased.  The sign related to both seabaseReorderThreshold;s and 
unitSupplyThreshold’s coefficient are difficult to validate with information interpreted 
from Figures 24 and 25, and will require deeper analysis to confirm their values. 
The correlation matrix and scatter plot for the predictor variables listed in Figure 
21 is shown below in Figure 22.  The predictor variables numberOfUnits and 
numberOfHelos are moderately related to the response variable with correlation values of 
0.6650 and -0.6164, respectively.  The remaining predictors, seabaseReorderThreshold 
and unitSupplyThreshold, show practically no relation to heloUtilization with correlation 




Figure 22.   Correlation Matrix and Scatter Plot for heloUtilization 
 
 
Figure 23 below shows the average heloUtilization across all units for 
numberOfHelos equal to one, two, three, and four respectively.  In terms of this model, as 
the number of helicopters assigned to the seabase increases, the average heloUtilization 
decreases for all values of numberOfUnits.  Fixing the value of numberOfHelos, the 




Figure 23.   Overlay Plot of heloUtilization vs. numberOfUnits for numberOfHelos = {1, 









Figure 25.   Overlay Plot of heloUtilization vs. unitSupplyThreshold 
 
The average heloUtilization, across all values of numberOfHelos, ranges from 
0.506, for numberOfHelos equal to one and numberOfUnits equal to ten, to 0.0135, for 
numberOfHelos equal to four and numberOfUnits equal to one.  Utilizing the formula to 
calculate heloUtilization, the average number of idle helicopters over the simulated time 
period can be calculated using the average heloUtilization values.  Table 6 summarizes 
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the average number of idle helicopters for each level of numberOfHelos and 
numberOfUnits equaling one and ten (the parameter’s minimum and maximum level). 
 
numberOfHelos numberOfUnits = 1 numberOfUnits = 10 
1 0.946 0.494 
2 1.946 1.473 
3 2.946 2.464 
4 3.946 3.463 
 
Table 6.   Calculated Average Number of Idle Helicopters 
 
The values in Table 6 indicate that embarking additional helicopters on the 
seabase to perform logistic delivery missions only increases the average number of idle 
helicopters by the same degree.  In the case where numberOfUnits equals one, regardless 
of the numberOfHelos embarked, only one helicopter on average is employed a fraction 
of the simulated time; whereas for numberOfUnits equaling ten, regardless of the 
numberOfHelos embarked, the single helicopter is employed more frequently over the 
simulated time period to support the larger numberOfUnits. 
 
5. Seabase Storage Capacity 
Is the square-foot area allocated to SOF, per (LPD-17 ORD), adequate to 
successfully perform Special Operations from a LPD-17 class seabase?  The minimum 
square foot area on a LPD-17 allocated to SOF and/or EOD personnel is 400 square feet.  
The engineering of design points within a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
uses both the small and large value of a parameter’s range along with permutated values 
between these two figures.  Table 7 shows the design point with capacity set to 400 along 















0.6 0.5 10 400 10 4 
 
Table 7.   Design Point Containing Minimum seabaseStorageCapacity  
 
Despite having the maximum allowed helicopters embarked, the maximum 
number of units employed by the seabase, and the SOF units ordering supplies each time 
their on-hand quantities are at 50% their maximum capacity, the LPD-17 class ship is 
able to achieve a Net Effectiveness of 100% in sustaining units ashore with the minimum 
SOF-allocated square-foot area it is designed to contain.   
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the results of the simulation through a variety of analytical 
techniques.  Linear regression for the numberOfUnitBalks, averageBalkTime, and 
heloUtilization output parameters accounted for much of the variability and led to good 
predictive models.  Net effectiveness for supply commodities issued was 100% for all 
design points within the simulation, indicating no partial quantity issues were performed 
by the seabase.  Helicopter utilization appeared to remain fairly constant with the addition 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to identify what level of support and capability is 
required to logistically sustain a varied amount of SOF units from a single-ship Seabase.  
A Discrete Event Simulation (DES), written in Java computer language utilizing the 
Simkit package, was used to model the notional seabasing scenario.  Key components 
were identified and built into the DES as objects that interact based on their particular 
roles within the scenario.  The interactions created data points that were analyzed using 
regression and marginal benefit analysis.  Analysis models within this thesis apply only 
to the predictor variables, as defined in Chapter IV, along with their respective range of 
values.  Conclusions and recommendations stated in this chapter identified through 
analysis and interpretation of data relationships are within the scope and boundaries of 
this model. 
 
A. MODEL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Net Effectiveness and Seabase Capacity 
Recall from Chapter IV that Net Effectiveness is a function of, among other 
things, capacity.  Net Effectiveness was 100% for all combinations of design factors 
input to the simulation.  In other words, regardless of: the number of helicopters 
embarked, the number of Special Operations Forces (SOF) units employed, the number 
of personnel within each unit, how frequent the seabase and SOF units request material, 
and the square foot area allocated as storage to the SOF units above the minimum area 
per ship design, the LPD-17 class ship is able to fully sustain SOF units operating ashore 
without compromising mission success by issuing partial supply quantities.  This is 
contingent on the availability of a resupply ship to sustain the seabase. 
Regression models associated with the number of unit balks, the average balk 
time, and helicopter utilization indicate the seabase storage capacity is not practically 
significant in affecting the values of these three response variables, validating the range 
of capacity set within the model is adequate in supporting SOF units operating ashore.  
The results of the model also validates the adequacy of the square-foot area SOF units 
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require to successfully perform the LPD-17 secondary mission of Naval Special Warfare 
outlined in (LPD-17 ORD). 
 
2. Helicopter Utilization 
Analysis results found in Table 6 of Chapter IV suggests that adding more than 
one helicopter to the seabase has a minimal affect on improving utilization.  It would 
appear that one helicopter is able to support the model’s maximum number of SOF units 
employed by the seabase and still maintain an average utilization of 0.463.  If a theater 
commander had to use this single data point to decide how many helicopter assets to 
assign to the seabase, only one would be allocated.  This brings up a flaw in using 
utilization by itself as a measure of effectiveness.  Figures 11 and 16, along with Tables 4 
and 5, in Chapter IV shows the substantial marginal benefit of adding additional 
helicopters to minimize both the number of times a unit enters a balk state and the time 
spent in that state.  Taking away helicopter resources from the seabase may free up 
equipment to be used elsewhere in the theater, but will greatly affect the ability of SOF 
units operating ashore to perform their missions in a timely manner when operationally 
required. 
The law of diminishing returns will play a role in deciding how many additional 
helicopters to embark on the seabase.  The benefit realized through the objective value of 
minimizing the frequency which a unit enters a balk state, and the associated time spent 
in the balk state, will decrease as the number of helicopters embarked increases.  Figure 
26 below uses numeric data from Table 4.  The knee in the curve represents the value of 
numberOfHelos where a diminishing marginal benefit exists in further seeking to 
minimize the numberOfUnitBalks.  The decision to limit the number of helicopters used 
to support SOF ashore based solely on marginal benefit analysis can be detrimental to the 
operational effectiveness of the campaign.  The additional cost of increasing the number 
of helicopters may in reality be inconsequential to the importance of SOF mission timing 
and operational advantage.  For example, the increased cost in adding a fourth helicopter 
to the seabase has a diminishing return (Figure 26), but decreases the unit balk 
occurrences by 82% over a three year period (Table 4).  This can mean the difference in 
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waging a successful Special Operations campaign.  Figure 27 shows a similar argument 
for averageBalkTime data drawn from Table 5. 




















Figure 26.   Relationship Between numberOfUnitBalks vs. numberOfHelos 
 






















Figure 27.   Relationship Between averageBalkTime vs. numberOfHelos 
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The low utilization numbers resulting from the model do lead to benefits.  
Helicopters remaining idle for a given period of time on the seabase give the operational 
commander flexibility in employing these assets in support of other mission areas.  
Maritime Interdiction Operations, maritime-borne Search and Rescue, and crew training 
are some examples of mission areas a commander can assign idle helicopters to as the 
operational environment dictates.  On occasion, SOF units performing highly combat 
intensive Direct Action missions may require aerial extraction upon mission completion.  
This process would require multiple armed air assets to enter a ‘hot’ landing zone for 
personnel and casualty extraction.  A seabase commander would be able to answer this 
short-notice request by having idle air assets available to deploy. 
Flexibility in performing a variety of missions is crucial in meeting the concepts 
defining Seabasing.  A commander with a given level of capability must strike a delicate 
balance between capability allocation among forces and risk associated with 
accomplishing missions; this is crucial in achieving objectives across the range of 
military operations.  Using utilization of a capability as a measurement for decision-
making by itself must be taken with extreme caution.  Greater insight, and better 
decisions, can be drawn by using other measures of effectiveness and capability 
utilization together. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Potential follow-on studies may include researching the effects of: 
• Modeling randomness in the availability of a resupply ship to sustain the 
seabase; 
• Incorporating missions, to include maintenance downtime, designed for 
the embarked helicopters to perform besides logistic support; and. 
• Implementing a repair process on the Equipment supply commodity, and 




Further enhancements to the Discrete Event Simulation model may include: 
• Implementing an algorithm, such as traveling salesman, to model the 
helicopter supporting multiple units within one supply delivery mission; 
• Modeling various types of terrain the SOF units will traverse to vary the 
consumption rates of each supply commodity; and 
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APPENDIX A – EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS 
A. USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD-17) 
 
Figure 28.   USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD-17) 
 
• Length:  684 ft (208 m) 
• Beam:  105 ft (32 m) 
• Draft:  23 ft (7 m) 
• Speed:  22+ knots 
• Crew:  363 
• Troop:  699 
• Vehicle Deck Space:  25,000 sq ft (2,323 sq m) 
• Cargo / Ammunition Magazines:  25,000 cu ft (708 cu m) 
• Ship – Shore Lift:  Two Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC);  14 Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV) 
• Flight Deck:  Landing for 2 CH-53E, or 4 AH/UH-1s, or 4 CH-46, or 2 MV-
22 
• Hangar Facilities:  1 CH-53E, or 2 CH-46, or 1 V-22, or 3 UH/AH-1s 
• Cargo Fuel:  JP-5 (42,000 cu ft); MOGAS (1,342 cu ft) 
• Medical:  4 operating theaters (two medical, two dental), 24 bed ward, 100 
casualty overflow beds 
• Propulsion:  4 medium speed, turbocharged marine diesels (40,000 hp) 
• Combat Systems: 
o Two Mk 31 Mod 0 RIM – 116A Rolling-Airframe Missile (RAM) 
system 
o Two Mk 46 Mod 1 30mm Close In Gun System 
 
(Source:  Federation of American Scientists website  http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/lpd-17.htm accessed June 2006) 
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B. HH – 60G PAVE HAWK 
 
Figure 29.   HH – 60G Pave Hawk Helicopter 
 
• Primary Function:  Infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of Special 
Operations Forces in day, night or marginal weather conditions. 
• Builder:  Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. 
• Power Plant:  Two General Electric T700 – GE – 701C engines 
• Thrust:  1,560 – 1,940 shaft horsepower each engine 
• Length:  64 feet, 8 inches (17.1 meters) 
• Height:  16 feet, 8 inches (4.4 meters) 
• Rotary Diameter:  53 feet, 7 inches (14.1 meters) 
• Speed:  184 mph (294.4 kph) 
• Maximum Takeoff Weight:  22,000 pounds (9,979 kilograms) 
• External Cargo Capacity:  8,000 pounds (3628.7 kilograms) 
• Range:  445 statute miles (504 nautical miles); unlimited with air refueling 
• Armament:  Two 7.62mm mini-guns 
 
(Source:  Air Force Link website  http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=107 









APPENDIX B – MODEL EVENT GRAPHS 
Run OrderSOFToDropPoint(unit)
unitState == IDLE














































Adjusts supplies for consumption




















upply quantities are above threshold}
unitState == BALK
0.0
{Supply quantities are below threshold}
 















































































Adjusts commodity on-hand capacity for material issued
Generates a requisition if supply quantities on-hand fall 
below the threshold for any single commodity
0.0
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Adjusts on-hand capacity for each commodity received
Run
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Figure 46.   heloUtilization for numberOfHelicopter =  with numberOfUnits within unitSupplyThreshold 
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APPENDIX D – SOF UNIT SUPPLIES AND WEIGHTS 
Supply Type Item Quantity Weight (lbs) 
Ammunition Full Magazines for 
M4A1 and M249 SAW 
8 per person 8.4 
 Frag and Smoke 
Grenades 
8 per person 8 
Equipment AN/PRC 117F(C) 1 per unit 15.9(Harris Corp.) 
 AN/PRC - 126 1 per person 3.125(Brooke Clark) 




Navigational, ISR gear) 
Mission dictates per 
person 
~10 
 M4A1 SOPMOD 1 per person (unless 
issued M249) 
~ 7 
 M249 SAW 1 per unit 15.16 
 Protective Gear (e.g. 
Clothing, Helmet, 
Goggles) 
1 per person 14.19 (Note: not 
included in carried 
weight) 
 Body Armor 1 per person (mission 
dependent) 
33 
Medical Personal Medkit 1 per person 1 
 Field Medical Bag 1 per unit ~ 30 
Subsistence Meals Ready to Eat 8 per person 10.4 
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